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Following the end of the Cold War the Norwegian Armed Forces went through 
several significant periods of reform that arguably created as many problems as 
they solved. Despite reducing the troop numbers, bases and materiel of the 
Armed Forces, at the turn of the century the Norwegian Armed Forces were still 
not able to solve its mission or balance its budget. In the period between 2005-
2014, even further reforms were set to be implemented, and the leadership of 
the Armed Forces felt compelled to look at new avenues to save money and 
retain capabilities in the process. In the following years, several studies showed 
that one such avenue was multinational defence cooperation (MDC), which was a 
method to both save money and retain capabilities. Following these studies 
Norway entered into two major MDC initiatives: The Nordic Defence Cooperation 
(NORDEFCO) initiative, and NATO’s ‘Smart Defence’ initiative. These initiatives 
were different in methodology and scope, but both promised significant cost 
savings and increased ability, if only participants committed to the initiatives. 
My thesis seeks to understand both how and why Norway was motivated to take 
part in these initiatives individually, and to understand what can be said to be 
the Norwegian approach to MDC in general.  
 
Though these two areas of MDC are very different, Norway’s motivation and 
behaviour in them contain some similarities. Traditionally, Norway has been an 
importer of security that wanted to maximise potential for Great Powers to 
come to her aid when needed. It is my argument that this is also a significant 
motivation for Norway’s participation in MDC initiatives. MDC can be an avenue 
to create bonds between nations, bonds that can be utilised, when needed, to 
gather support. As such, such participation is a strategy for Norway in an of 
itself. For MDC to have maximum effect, certain sacrifices of control and 
freedom of action have to be made by the participants. Norway’s behaviour in 
these two initiatives shows that Norway is unwilling to make such sacrifices, 
rendering the cooperation relatively ineffective compared to its stated ambition. 
As such, it it my contention that Norway’s stated goals for defence cooperation; 
cost savings and capability retention, are subjugated to her goals of creating 
bonds between nations in order to secure reciprocity and support, in the event it 
is needed in the future.  
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In 2005 a meeting took place between the newly appointed Norwegian Chief of 
Defence, General Sverre Diesen, and Minister of Defence Anne Grethe Strøm-
Erichsen. The General, who had 35 years of experience in military affairs, 
wanted to explain to his new boss, a politician with no military experience, that 
despite extensive reforms of the last five years the state of affairs in the 
Norwegian Armed forces was not as satisfactory as some would have it. He 
detailed his understanding of the current situation, the factors influencing it, 
and finally outlined his vision for the future of the Norwegian Armed Forces 
(NAF), which he summed up like this:  
If we were to extrapolate [recent developments] it would take 20-25 
years until we reach a point where it in my opinion is hard to claim 
that we have any sort of meaningful national defence capability.1  
Following this meeting, General Diesen and Minister Strøm-Erichsen oversaw a 
period of some of the largest and most extensive reforms in NAF’s history. Bases 
were closed, record-breaking procurement programs were initiated, and new 
ways of obtaining and retaining military capabilities were explored.2 General 
Diesen, as controversial as Norwegian Generals come,3 had already been fighting 
for years to implement reform and change the mind-set of an organisation 
moulded by the Cold War. One such previously unheard of idea, was the concept 
that Norway would integrate her defence structures with her neighbouring and 
aligned countries, through various bilateral and multilateral agreements. This 
concept, the concept of multinational defence cooperation and integration, will 
be the overarching theme of this thesis.  
Multinational Defence Cooperation (MDC) in Norway was not a creation of 
General Diesen, the NAF had cooperated with other militaries for decades since 
                                         
1 Information from Mr Sverre Diesen, 5 January 2015 
2 ‘Defence Study 2007’, ’Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2007 – Sluttrapport’, 
http://bfo.no/images/uploads/dokumenter/FS07_komplett_versjon.pdf, accessed 7 July 2015, 
pp. 18-30 
3 General Diesen was described as strong-willed and outspoken, something that is relatively 
uncommon for officers in the public debate. An example of reactions to Diesen’s behaviour can 




Norwegian independence in 1905, specifically with NATO countries along with 
the nonaligned Nordic countries. However, while the MDC efforts prior to the 
mid 2000s were limited, and not a significant part of Norwegian policy, MDC 
gained significant traction just a few years following 2005 signifying a 
considerable shift in opinion on the matter.  
Problem statement and research questions 
From 2005 onward, deep multinational defence cooperation arose as an 
expressed potential strategy for the Norwegian Armed Forces in order to achieve 
cost savings and capability retention, as seen in white papers and military 
studies in the latter part of the decade. Despite this change in attitude, studies 
have shown that projects and efforts to implement MDC have not yielded savings 
in accordance with their intention, and several projects have been very public 
failures. This contrast of potential versus actual reward is interesting in that it 
begs the question what is happening in the process, a question that is worthy of 
study. Because efforts to promote MDC has not been voiced with the same 
intensity before 2005, describing the specific factors driving the change would 
be useful to understand the process of change within the Armed Forces 
themselves, as well as the MoD as its governing agency. Moreover, since studies 
have shown that the efforts have left something to be desired of MDC despite 
Norway being involved in two major MDC initiatives in the period, shedding light 
on why this is could provide some insight into specific characteristics of 
Norwegian defence reform and defence tradition.  
To establish a clear and concise objective in my research I have outlined two 
main research questions to be answered in my thesis. These are:  
1) What motivated the Norwegian Armed Forces to participate in multinational defence 
cooperation after 2005? 
2) Using ‘Smart Defence’ and Nordic Defence Cooperation as case studies, what can be said to 
be the ‘Norwegian approach’ to multinational defence cooperation in the period from 2005 
to 2014?  
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When my research questions are answered, my objective is that my research will 
shed new light on the role of multinational defence cooperation in Norwegian 
defence policy. 
Limitations and thesis structure 
In this thesis, I will seek to explore the main drivers of multinational defence 
cooperation following Gen. Diesen’s appointment as Chief of Defence in 2005, 
and to the NATO Wales Summit in the fall of 2014. Furthermore, I will try to 
derive what characteristics can be said to be the ‘Norwegian approach’ to 
multinational defence cooperation. To do this, I have chosen to study the two 
largest multinational frameworks for cooperation in the period, Nordic Defence 
Cooperation and NATO Smart Defence. These are chosen because they represent 
very clear and contrasting areas of cooperation for the Norwegian military, as 
the Nordic Defence Cooperation framework is conducted outside of NATO, and 
the Smart Defence framework is within the NATO structure. The choice of case 
studies is also based on the fact that these are the two largest avenues of 
defence cooperation for the Norwegian Armed Forces, and the most significant 
initiatives that have been seen in these domains the last few decades. 
Additionally, the rationales behind their conception are also similar, making 
them useful for comparison. I believe that how and where the Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) and the NAF choose to focus their efforts says something about 
where they perceive Norwegian security to be rooted, and where it should be 
developed. This will be expanded upon in the case studies.  
By choosing a relatively short timeframe (10 years) and two very distinct and 
multilateral cooperation areas, some areas that have a long history in the 
Norwegian Armed Forces, such as certain bilateral agreements, will have to be 
excluded. The most prominent examples are agreements for cooperation with 
the United States, and the United Kingdom, which have long been instrumental 
in the development of the Norwegian Armed Forces. And although the timeframe 
is short, the period I have studied saw events that had significant effect of 
developments on a global scale, causing an accelerated pace of development, 
and the emergence of wholly new methods in the area of military cooperation 
between nations. Furthermore, ‘Nordic Defence Cooperation’ and ‘Smart 
Defence’ are not the only cooperation projects of the period, but they are the 
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ones who contain the most far-reaching and comprehensive ambitions of 
cooperation, at least in concept. Other frameworks, such as NATO’s Lisbon 
Critical Capabilities and Connected Forces Initiative, along with the smaller 
Nordic initiatives preceding the Nordic Defence Cooperation initiative, can also 
provide insight into Norwegian patterns of behaviour, but will not be studied in 
this thesis. This is done in order to achieve a necessary depth to the study of the 
two chosen cases.  
To properly examine the emergence of MDC in the Norwegian military, I believe 
it necessary to first establish a foundation for understanding of the major 
reforms that have been conducted since the end of the Cold War, reforms that 
have transformed the Norwegian Armed Forces and brought about new thinking. 
I will describe the main periods of reform of the Norwegian Armed Forces from 
the end of the Cold War in 1991, to 2005. This is done in order to understand the 
process of change leading to the ‘current situation’ that General Diesen referred 
to above. This description will focus on reforms, and not policy, strategy or 
operations. This is done in order to understand the pattern of behaviour in the 
reform processes of the Norwegian Armed Forces. This will in turn be used to 
place MDC and the reforms of 2005-2014 in a larger context. 
My thesis will be comprised of an introduction, four chapters that form the main 
body, and a conclusion. Chapter one will focus on the changes to and reform of 
the Norwegian Armed Forces from 1991 to 2005. This chapter will provide insight 
into the extremely challenging transition from a Cold War-minded defensive 
force, to a relatively capable expeditionary force. I will explain how budgets 
declined all the way through the 1990s, in an effort to cash in the so-called 
peace dividend following the demise of the Warsaw Pact, and how the 
perceptions of Norwegian security changed throughout the same period. 
Furthermore, I will describe how the developments of the 1990s caused the NAF 
to become a force too large too sustain, leading to a state of crisis and the need 
for, and eventual implementation of, several rounds of reform during the early 
to mid 2000s. The end of this chapter will seek to establish a bridge between the 
developments of the end of the Cold War, through the crises-reform cycle of the 
2000s to the emergence of General Diesen’s radical ideas regarding MDC. 
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In chapter two I will attempt to describe the history and workings of the Nordic 
Defence Cooperation initiative. I will highlight the role of General Diesen and 
how his two major studies, the Possibilities Study and the Defence Study, 
influenced Norwegian thoughts of MDC in general, and NORDEFCO specifically. I 
will also outline the organisational workings of the NORDEFCO initiative and its 
development from foundation until 2014, along with some of the major 
successes and challenges. These include the failed procurement of the ‘Archer’ 
self-propelled artillery system, and the success of the much lauded ‘cross border 
training’ project. The end of the chapter will focus on how Norway has 
approached the initiative, arguing that Norway has seen a great deal of promise 
in the Nordic domain in general, and NORDEFCO in particular, since 2009.  
In the third chapter I will attempt to describe the long roots of NATO’s ‘Smart 
Defence’ initiative, and how this is one of a long line of initiatives NATO has 
undertaken to tackle some of the most fundamental challenges in the 
organisation: the disparity of burden-sharing between the USA and Europe. I will 
explain how the ‘Great Recession’ provided the point of departure for Fogh-
Rasmussen’s speech during the Munich security conference in 2011, and how that 
speech started a chain of events leading to the initiative itself. I will also, as 
with NORDEFCO, outline the organisational workings of ‘Smart Defence’ along 
with successes and challenges.  
The fourth chapter will seek to describe how recent events, mainly the Crisis in 
Ukraine, has affected the Norwegian approach to defence cooperation, and the 
sense of necessity of MDC in Europe at large. I will discuss how the developments 
in Ukraine caused Norway to argue for a necessary change in attitude in the 
NATO alliance and among the Nordic countries, a change that affected MDC’s 
place on the list of priorities for all parties involved.  
Translations and terminology 
This thesis deals to a great extent with Norwegian writing and Norwegian oral 
history sources. There are instances where I will have to translate book or article 
titles and text from Norwegian into English. In the event that the translation is 
my own, I will postfix [ed. transl.] to the quotation so that it is clear that the 
translation is my own. In the event of quotations from my interview subjects, 
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the translation of all quotations and excerpts will be my own. Therefore, such a 
postfix will be unnecessary.  
When studying the Nordic countries and/or the Scandinavian countries, some 
confusion can exist as to which countries fall under what category. The Nordic 
countries are Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Iceland. The Scandinavian 
countries are the countries that lie on the Scandinavian Peninsula: Norway and 
Sweden, plus Denmark. This is important to note, because this is not only a 
geographic distinction, but also a distinction in culture and heritage. 
In Norway, the terms ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘peace establishment’ missions are not 
widely used. Instead, the term ‘internasjonale operasjoner’ (international 
operations [ed. trans.]) is used in both cases. I will use the Norwegian method of 
referring to such missions.  
During reform cycles of the Norwegian Armed Forces several studies have been 
produced to provide decision makers with a decision basis. Normally the Chief of 
Defence produces one study as a military recommendation to the Minister of 
Defence, which in recent years have been called ‘Forsvarsstudie’, with the year 
of publication as a discriminator. All such studies will be referred to as ‘Defence 
Studies’ in this thesis. Moreover, the Ministry of Defence has conjunctionally 
commissioned an independent study made up by politicians, scholars, officers 
and subject matter experts. These studies have had many names during the 
years, from ‘Forsvarskommisjon’ (Defence Commission), and ‘Forsvarspolitisk 
Utvalg’ (Defence Political Commission), to ‘Ekspertutvalg’ (Expert Commission). 
For sake of simplicity, I will refer to all such studies as Defence White Papers, 
with the year of publication as a discriminator.  
In the Norwegian Armed Forces, the term ‘Styrkeproduksjon’ is widely used and 
has no equivalent English translation. The literal translation is ‘strength 
production’, and is an umbrella term for any activity aimed at making troops 
combat ready. In this thesis I will substitute this term with the more generic 
term ‘training and exercises’.  
Lastly, the term ‘structural element’ is widely used in this thesis and in the 
source material. This term usually reflects a specific set of materiel that can 
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operate independently. A fleet of fighter aircraft is a structural element; a light 
infantry battalion is also a structural element, but both require more than just a 
fighter jet or a soldier with a rifle, to function. They need support elements, 
staff, maintenance and so on. The term bundles together all the required 
elements to enable the capability in question to operate.  
Short description of NORDEFCO and ‘Smart Defence’ 
The Nordic Defence Cooperation initiative was established in November 2009, 
following a meeting of all the Nordic Defence Ministers in Helsinki, effectively 
replacing several lesser agreements between the Nordic countries.4 The purpose 
of the initiative, as laid out in the Memorandum of Understanding that 
effectively created the NORDEFCO framework, was to ‘strengthen the 
participants’ national defence, explore common synergies and facilitate 
efficient common solutions.’5 NORDEFCO came about two years after the 
‘Possibilities Study’6 was published in 2007, and replaced a number of small and 
fragmented initiatives in the Nordic domain, merging them under a common 
umbrella. The initiative has seen some degree of success, but has not been 
without scandals and roadblocks. The NORDEFCO organisation and method 
focuses on a lean organisation, minimising bureaucracy and maximising output.7 
Such a priority has not been vocalised as much in the NATO domain, highlighting 
the main difference between the two: size and flexibility of the organisation.  
NATO’s ‘Smart Defence’ initiative is in many ways the brainchild of former NATO 
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Rasmussen coined the term ‘Smart 
Defence’ in his keynote speech at the Munich security conference in 2011. 
However the initiative did not gain real traction until NATO’s Chicago summit in 
                                         
4 ‘NORDEFCO MoU between Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Iceland’, signed 4 
November 2009, http://www.norden.org/en/om-samarbejdet-1/nordic-agreements/treaties-and-
agreements/defence-affairs/memorandum-of-understanding-on-nordic-defence-cooperation-
nordefco, accessed 13 September 2015’ 
5 Ibid. 
6 ‘Ömesidigt förstärkande försvarslösningar: Norsk-svensk studie av möjligheterna till fördjupat 
samarbete’. The study is known as ‘Mulighetsstudien’ in Norwegian, which translates to 
‘Possibilities Study’ in English. 
https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fd/dokumenter/svensk-
norsk_mulighetsstudie_1.pdf, accessed 7 July 2015 
7 ‘NORDEFCO Annual Report 2012’, 
http://www.nordefco.org/files/Design/NORDEFCO%20Annual%20Report%202012.pdf, 
accessed 6 September 2015, p. 5, 22 
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2012. In Chicago, all NATO countries committed to the concept of ‘Smart 
Defence’ as outlined by the Secretary General in his Munich speech. The purpose 
of the initiative was to ensure that NATO could ‘develop, acquire and maintain 
the capabilities required to achieve the goals of ‘NATO Forces 2020’’.8 As is 
often the case when NATO conducts its business, ‘Smart Defence’ struggled with 
the number of nations involved, differing goals and objectives, and a weak 
mandate. As I will explain later on, Norway has been an active member in the 
‘Smart Defence’ work, taking the lead in one project, and participating in 
several others.  
Available work in the field of study 
In recent years, there have been some major publications in the area of the 
history of the Norwegian Armed Forces. In 2004 a group of authors led by 
Professor Olav Riste published the fifth and final volume of their ‘Norsk 
forsvarshistorie’, which translates to ‘Norwegian Defence History’.9 Volume five 
covered the years from 1970 to 2000 and is arguably the largest and most 
substantial work on the development of the Norwegian Armed Forces after World 
War II. Prior to this work, few publications existed where the Armed Forces and 
not the more general term ‘Foreign Relations’ were at the centre point. An 
example of such a work is Mr Riste’s ‘Norway’s Foreign Relations’, originally 
published in 2001, which is a landmark work spanning the entirety of Norwegian 
foreign relations history to the year 2000. Ståle Ulriksen’s work ‘Den norske 
forsvarstradisjon’ (The Norwegian Defence Tradition), published in 2002,10 
represents a substantial analysis on the history and foundations of Norwegian 
tradition for discussing military matters. His critical viewpoints regarding the 
establishment of certain ‘truths’ and their effect on the structuring of the 
military is certainly useful to consider when discussing transformation processes 
in the military.  
                                         
8 ‘NATO Smart Defence’ webpage, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_84268.htm, accessed 
7 July 2015 
9 Olav Riste et. al, ’Norsk Forsvarshistorie: Allianseforsvar i endring’, (Oslo: Eide, 2004) 
10 Ståle Ulriksen, ’Den norske forsvarstradisjonen – Militærmakt eller folkeforsvar?’, (Oslo: Pax 
Forlag A/S, 2002) 
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Since 2001, attention has been focused on the effects of 11 September 2001, 
and the Norwegian Armed Forces being at war in Iraq and Afghanistan, rather 
than upon the general development of the Armed Forces or defence policy. 
Works like ‘Norges Kriger’ (Norwegian Wars),11 ‘Norge i internasjonale 
operasjoner’ (Norway in international operations)12 and more dramatic 
autobiographical works such as ‘Brødre i blodet – I krig for Norge’ (Blood 
brothers – At war for Norway)13 are focused on battles, individuals and specifics 
on the operations following the events of 9/11, although the work ‘Norwegian 
Wars’ does cover a great deal more than just the post-9/11 battles.  
In the area of Nordic security and defence policy, few books or major works have 
been published since NORDEFCO was founded. Although this is understandable 
because of the short timespan, it does pose some challenges to find quality 
writing on the subject. Håkon Lunde Saxi has provided several articles where he 
discusses Nordic defence cooperation. His work ‘Nordic Defence Cooperation 
After the Cold War’ published in the Oslo Files on Defence and Security in March 
2011, explores why and how the Nordic countries seeks to cooperate on defence 
matters, and whether they are likely to succeed. Saxi has quite possibly delved 
deeper into NORDEFCO than any other Norwegian scholar. His description of the 
bottom-up forces that were instrumental in creating NORDEFCO,14 along with his 
comparison of the structure and culture of the individual Nordic nations15 have 
been particularly useful in this thesis. Other scholars have also produced notable 
work on Nordic security, Tuomas Forsbergs work: ‘The rise of Nordic defence 
cooperation: A return to regionalism?’ provides a great deal of insight into the 
driving factors in Nordic defence cooperation, arguing that it is not purely an 
economic motivation but also a shared identity that drives cooperation.16 Clive 
Archer’s work on ‘the Stoltenberg Report and Nordic Security’ details the 
reasoning behind and effects of Thorvald Stoltenberg’s report on Nordic 
                                         
11 Per Erik Olsen (ed.), ’Norges Kriger – Fra Hafrsfjord til Afghanistan’, (Oslo: Vega Forlag, 2011) 
12 Tormod Heier et.al., ’Norge i internasjonale operasjoner – Militærmakt mellom idealer og 
realpolitikk’, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2014) 
13 Emil Johansen, ’Brødre i blodet – I krig for Norge’, (Oslo: Kagge forlag, 2011) 
14 Håkon Saxi, ’Nordic Defence Cooperation After the Cold War’, Oslo Files on Defence and 
Security, March (2011), p. 49  
15 Ibid, pp. 49-59 
16 Tuomas Forsberg, ’The rise of Nordic defence cooperation: a return to regionalism?’, 
International Affairs, 89: 5 (2013) p. 1161 
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cooperation. Archer also provides insight into Stoltenberg’s ideas and how they 
relate to existing frameworks for Nordic cooperation.17 None of these study 
Norwegian policy specifically, neither do they compare actions and behaviour in 
the two cooperation areas NORDEFCO and ‘Smart Defence’. This is where I will 
attempt to bring new insight to the field. 
There are many scholars working on questions concerning the North Atlantic 
Treaty Alliance. However, the ‘Smart Defence’ initiative has created few waves 
in the academic community. As with writing on NORDEFCO, there are few books 
or major works on this topic. Bastian Giengrich has been a vocal sceptic of 
‘Smart Defence’ in his work: ‘Smart Defence: Who’s buying?’ where discusses 
challenges relating to both national sovereignty and the challenges of a 
fragmented organisation such as NATO.18 Jacob Henius and Jacopo MacDonald 
provide a detailed account of the fundamentals of the ‘Smart Defence’ initiative 
in their ‘Smart Defence: A Critical Appraisal’.19 Also in the critical category, 
Marcin Terlikowski’s: ‘Not as smart as it could be: the NATO Smart Defence 
initiative’ details how the initiative was too focused on savings, and how 
bureaucracy and lack of trust hamper its progress.20 To provide new information 
in the area of Smart Defence, my research provides insight into how the 
framework is perceived by both a specific nation, but also specific people 
involved in Smart Defence projects.   
None of these authors, apart from Håkon Saxi, focus specifically on Norway’s 
relation to MDC, NORDEFCO or ‘Smart Defence’. Moreover, no publications from 
the Norwegian military, that I could access, discussed MDC and Norway 
specifically. Swedish officers have discussed Nordic cooperation to a great 
extent, indicating that the topic is more discussed and more interesting within 
the Swedish military organisation.21 My research is therefore breaking new 
                                         
17 Clive Archer, ’The Stoltenberg Report and Nordic Security: Big Ideas, Small Steps’, Danish 
Foreign Policy Yearbook, (2010), pp. 48-57 
18 Bastian Giengrich, ’Smart Defence: Who’s Buying?’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 54:3 
(2012), p. 73 
19 Jakob Henius and Jacopo MacDonald, ’Smart Defence: A Critical Appraisal’, NATO Defence 
College Forum Paper Series, 21 (2012) 
20 Marcin Terlikowski, ’Not as smart as it could be: the NATO Smart Defence initiative, Polish 
Institute of International Affairs Strategic Files, 22 (2012), pp. 1-5  
21 See the following masters theses from the Swedish Defence College: Jacob Strålmark, ’Nordiska 
försvarssamarbeten - Säkerhetspolitiska intentioner i kamp med ekonomiska realiteter’, 
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ground because it delves into the drivers of Norway’s approach to MDC as a 
strategy in and of itself, instead of focusing on a single area of cooperation.  
In the more general area of military reform studies, Tom Dyson has authored 
several articles and books detailing German defence reform.22 His studies 
showed how domestic policies seemingly unrelated to military matters, along 
with the important roles of significant personalities involve with the process, 
both limit and shape the resulting reform.23 This is also evident in my studies on 
Norwegian reform in the same period and following years.  
Methodology and ethical considerations 
I have chosen the qualitative interview method, known as oral history in the UK, 
to carry out my research, coupled with primary source text material from the 
government. The characteristics of the interview method include close contact 
between the researcher and the subject, verbal and visual expressions and 
observation of participants.24 I carried out one-on-one interviews with the 
subjects at a place and time of their choosing, with interview durations varying 
from ~30 minutes to ~2 hours. I conducted my interviews in line with the ethical 
requirements placed by the University on such research, including the required 
formal documents, the participant information sheet and the consent form. I 
believe that the forms that I provided the subjects, and the way I contacted 
subjects and scheduled interviews, satisfy the ethical requirements of subject 
safety, confidence, permission and consent. The subjects chose the time and 
location, they had obtained any and all required permissions for participation, 
and were informed of the unclassified nature of this project. They were also 
informed of, and consented to, their name being attached to any quotes from 
them. All information has been stored on a hard drive with 128-bit encryption, 
                                                                                                                           
Swedish Defence College, (2014), Jonas Ottosson, ’Nordiskt försvarssamarbete i 
åtstrammingens tidevarv’, Swedish Defence College, (2012). 
22 Tom Dyson, ’German Military Reform 1998-2004: Leadership and the Triumph of Domestic 
Constraint over International Opportunity’, European Security 
Vol. 14, No. 3, 361/386, September 2005  
23 Ibid., p. 1 
24 Tove Thaagard, ’Systematikk og Innlevelse – En innføring i kvalitativ metode’, (Bergen: 
Fagbokforlaget, 2009), p. 11 
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following transfer from a recording device. At no time has any raw material been 
distributed to any party.  
The chosen method is effective at extracting a large amount of information from 
each subject, due to the verbal form and the time spent during interviews, 
leading the researcher to be able to obtain knowledge about how the subject 
thinks and reflects on his own experiences.25 This leads to data gathering that is 
not just simple metrics, but structured thought, arguments and an individual’s 
own insights. I chose this method because of the complex nature of the subject 
matter, and a need for depth in the data gathered in order to understand the 
processes at work.  
I contacted my subjects by either phone or email, sending them my participant 
info sheet, so that they could understand my project and what they were asked 
to do. Those who were interested in meeting me also received some bullet 
points up-front, based on their expertise, so that they could prepare for the 
interview if needed. My own preparations involved gathering information about 
the subject, his background and work history, so that I could tailor my questions 
to his expertise. During the interview I utilised form of interviewing called 
‘partially structured approach’.26 The structured element of my approach was 
that I had the bullet points in front of me, the same ones provided to the 
subject. I then used the bullets as starting points, giving the subject an easy way 
into the subject matter. I did not restrict the interview to these topics; rather I 
let the subject lead the way into other topics, as he felt natural or informative. 
This way I was assured of covering all the points that I felt was required, and at 
the same time allowing for a more natural dialogue and rapport between the 
subject and I.  
My goal was to obtain access to subjects involved in work on both NORDEFCO and 
‘Smart Defence’ across all the main levels of military planning: the strategic, 
the operational and the tactical level. I have succeeded in all but one, with no 
subjects involved in the tactical level of work on NORDEFCO. I have interviewed 
five current or former members of the Norwegian Armed Forces and the 
                                         
25 Ibid, p. 12 
26 Ibid, p. 89 
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Norwegian Ministry of Defence. The amount of subjects is quite low, but this is 
normal in qualitative studies focusing on depth.  
Weaknesses in choice of method 
When working with qualitative interviews, the subject may sometimes feel 
obligated to respond to questions in a way that they expect the researcher to 
want them to, providing answers that are more in line with the researcher’s 
values and opinions.27 Moreover, it is more than likely that the subjects shaped 
their answers to fit their own narratives or beliefs, even in a response that was 
seemingly objective and neutral. I believe this challenge may in the case of my 
research be aggravated by the fact that I am myself an officer and therefore a 
colleague of the subject. Moreover, the fact that I provided bullet-points and 
topics up-front may have influenced the subject’s responses toward that subject 
matter. It is hard to mediate these challenges, it would be dishonest of me to 
attempt to hide my military background and employ, and it would also be hard 
to avoid informing the subjects of the subject matter in question during the 
interview. Furthermore, the matter at hand is subject to interpretation by 
anyone, thus allowing the subject to project any desired narrative. I believe that 
my behaviour during the interviews and my emphasis in each interview that the 
project was self-funded and in no way affiliated with the NAF, established a 
sufficient sense of research independence for the subject to consider this as a 
non-military project. I also believe that I have obtained an enough sources to 
allow me to identify if and when my sources are projecting a personal belief or 
narrative. This occurred in all my interviews, most notably in General Diesen’s 
case, where an agenda toward MDC is easily identified.  
Another weakness of the method is one that is present in all qualitative 
research: the lack of larger, more measurable metrics for comparison. Through 
quantitative research I could have been able to gain a metric to compare how 
much effort, money or otherwise, Norway has put into either NORDEFCO or 
‘Smart Defence’. However, since my focus has been on the individual’s 
experiences and thoughts on the processes involved in MDC in Norway, and not 
on such metrics, I consider it outside the scope of this thesis.  
                                         




My primary sources are as mentioned five current or former NAF or MoD 
employees. These are, with organisational affiliation, expertise and rank if 
applicable:  
Name Affiliation Expertise Rank 
Sverre Diesen Norwegian Defence Research 
Institute, former Chief of Defence 
History and 
development 
of the NAF, 
NORDEFCO 
General (ret.) 






Inge Kampenes Norwegian MoD, structure and 








of the NAF 
Commander 
Knut Are Seierstad Norwegian MoD, Smart Defence 
coordinator 
Smart Defence Lieutenant 
Colonel 
 
Sverre Diesen is arguably the one person that has had the most influence on the 
development of the Norwegian military since 2000. His role in the reforms in 
2000, 2007, the Possibilities Study, and his efforts as Chief of Defence and as a 
military writer, have influenced the direction of the Norwegian Armed Forces in 
a significant way. His information provides insight into the strategic level of 
decision making in this field, his thinking and priorities at the time these events 
happened, and his personal thoughts on these developments.  
Sigurd Glærum has extensive experience in military research from both NATO 
and the Norwegian Defence Research Institute. His observations from being the 
project manager on the only NATO Smart Defence project led by Norway, 
provides valuable insight into how multinational cooperation can work in 
practice on the tactical and operational level, and what factors affect the 
progress of such projects.  
Inge Kampenes has been chair of the NORDEFCO ‘Capabilities’ cooperation area, 
as well as head of the Norwegian MoD’s capabilities and structural planning 
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section. As such, Kampenes has extensive experience in the strategic processes 
surrounding the development of the Norwegian Armed Forces, as well as being 
arguably the foremost authority on NORDEFCO in Norway.  
Jon Meyer has experience from the organisation section of the Norwegian 
Defence Staff, and has seen first-hand how multinational defence projects can 
materialise either bottom-up or top-down, and how they transition from the 
strategic to the operational and tactical level. Although he is not directly quoted 
or cited, his information provided insight into the relationship between the 
Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces themselves. 
Knut Are Seierstad was the first project manager for ‘Smart Defence’ in Norway, 
and exercised great influence on how the initiative was perceived in Norway, 
and what projects Norway participated in. Seierstad has great insight into the 
processes concerning multinational cooperation on an operational level, both in 
NATO and in Norway, and is arguably the foremost authority on ‘Smart Defence’ 
in Norway. 
I believe that I have gained access to some of the most influential and 
knowledgeable people in Norway in this field. However, due to the nature of 
military affairs, not all officers and officials consider themselves in a position to 
express their opinions on such matters, causing them to decline to be 
interviewed. As such, there is a risk that others could have provided greater 
insight or contradicting information. This is a risk that is unfortunately difficult 
to negate. 
In addition to my interviews, I have also utilised government documents and 
other reports that constitute primary source material. Examples of such material 
include Defence Studies, expert group reports, political group reports and more. 
Such documents are often referred to as ‘grey literature’ or ‘white papers’. 
These documents are online, except the Defence Studies of 2000 and 2007, 
which are not readily available online, despite being unclassified. These studies 
were provided to me by the MoD. These studies and reports provide context to 
the information provided by my subjects. Whereas my subjects provide insight in 
the processes that take place, the written work shed light of the decisions and 
end result that follow such processes. Moreover, speeches and parliamentary 
16 
 
proceedings have also been used to shed light on how arguments for and against 




1 The Norwegian Armed Forces after the Cold War 
In this chapter I will describe some of the challenges that the Norwegian Armed 
Forces faced after the end of the Cold War, and the efforts that were made to 
reform the Armed Forces to adjust to the changed post Cold War-world. I will 
also discuss some of the enduring characteristics of the Norwegian defence 
discourse, both in politics and elsewhere, that can greatly influence decision 
making and thinking. I will also discuss some of the more general developments 
regarding military technology that affect all Armed Forces, including Norway. 
These three areas, a changed world, discourse and tradition, as well as 
technological developments can be argued to play significant roles in shaping 
reform processes independently, even more so when they happen 
simultaneously.  
During the Cold War, Norwegian policymakers considered the nation an importer 
of security through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in which it 
was a founding member. After NATO was formed in 1949 the Norwegian public 
was told that the country was politically committed towards mutual assistance in 
the Alliance, assistance that Norway was set to receive and not provide, in the 
event of war.28 Despite this dependence on NATO, efforts were taken in order to 
preserve national freedom of action, as well as to avoid tension with the Soviet 
Union. This was achieved by implementing restrictions on several aspects of 
Allied (American) operations within Norwegian territory. The most notable 
restrictions were that Norway did not allow allies to establish bases within her 
borders or introduce nuclear weapons to her territory. Neither did she allow 
exercise activities in the areas closest to the Soviet Union.29 The idea was that 
while a defensive alliance was necessary due to the risk of war, the country felt 
a need to minimise this risk and reassure her neighbour in the east that northern 
Norway would not become ‘a springboard of aggression’.30  
Olav Riste states that Norway has a history of requiring special treatment, often 
in ways that allow the country to set requirements or demand commitments 
                                         
28 Riste, ‘Norway’s Foreign Relations’, p. 207 
29 Ibid, pp. 214-215 
30 Ibid, p. 216 
18 
 
from other nations, while at the same time avoiding having others set such 
requirements for Norway.31 According to Riste, Norway’s self-imposed 
restrictions represented a posture that had ‘no lack of ambivalences’, fuelled 
mainly by left-wing politicians sceptical towards American policies.32 This 
scepticism was not only directed at the U.S., as several incidents indicated that 
the Soviet Union conducted extensive intelligence operations and border 
violations on and over Norwegian territory, which was met with criticism in 
Norway.33 You could say that this scepticism was more directed at great powers 
in general, echoing a traditional sentiment of fear of the great powers 
squabbles, evident as early as in the 19th century as seen in the priest Nicolai 
Wergeland’s writings: 
Here we would live, so was Heaven’s Will, as the poor in his remote 
cabin, with limited means, content with less, enjoying the 
undisturbed Peace, without feeling the great’s lusts, but also not a 
part of their cabals, quarrels and grief. [ed. transl.]34 
The idea of Norway being a recipient of security was also evident in that 
‘holding time’ became the defining underlying principle governing the 
organisation of the Norwegian Armed Forces during the Cold War. The Armed 
Forces was meant to resist an attack from the Soviet Union long enough so that 
the country would not be lost until Allied reinforcements could arrive. 
Additionally, the idea was that Norway should be able to not only work with, but 
lead the allied forces supporting her. This required a large and credible 
command and control apparatus and logistical element that could command a 
much larger number of troops than were normally fielded by the NAF. This 
doctrine was dubbed an ‘Invasion Defence’, and was obviously almost entirely 
defensively oriented.35  
                                         
31 Olav Riste, ’Isolasjonisme og Stormaktsgarantiar’, Institute for Defence Studies, IFS no.3 (1991), 
p. 44 
32 Ibid, p. 214 
33 Rolf Tamnes and Knut Eriksen, ’Norge og NATO under den kalde krigen’, book chapter 
published online, 
http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/files/atlanterhavskomiteen.no/Tema/50aar/1a.htm, 
accessed 30 September 2015  
34 Nicolai Wergeland, in Riste, ’Isolasjonisme og Stormaktsgarantiar’, p. 8 
35 Jacob Børresen et. al., ‘Norsk Forsvarshistorie vol. 5’, (Bergen: Eide, 2004), p. 46 
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The opinions on what was the main purpose of the Armed Forces, along with 
what the position of Norway in the international community was, at least on the 
surface, a consensus-driven discourse. The phrase ‘there has long been an 
agreement on the main lines of Norwegian foreign policy [ed. transl.]’, or any 
equivalent, has been used often when discussing both foreign policy and defence 
policy.36 As one group of scholars noted: ‘Respectable and serious political 
parties can disagree, but hardly in security policy and questions regarding the 
relationship to the U.S.. [ed. transl.]’37 Samuel Huntington points out that such 
consensus may lead to a limited public debate regarding the issue at hand, an 
outcome that can certainly be argued to be seen in Norwegian defence discourse 
of the time, or lack thereof.38 Calls for an increased interest in foreign policy or 
defence policy have been presented and then largely ignored, further confirming 
Huntington’s argument.39 Because of this, the role of NATO and the purpose of 
the military has been almost a non-existent debate compared to other debates 
regarding the Norwegian public sector. Ståle Ulriksen argues that this consensus 
and limited debate create attitudes that over time will:  
[B]ecome so incorporated, so institutionalised, that they will assume 
the form of ‘truths’ or axioms. If the gap between the defined 
requirements and what you are actually doing becomes too large, the 
basis of the consensus will disappear and you will have periods of 
turmoil, conflict, debate and creativity. [ed. transl.]40 
Olav Riste claims that although the outside framing, settings and labels on 
Norwegian security changed from non-aligned, through neutral, to aligned, the 
contents defined as the core element of Norway’s security political position have 
                                         
36 Atle Skjærstad, ’Solid enighet om utenrikspolitikken’, Bergens Tidende, 4 April 2007, 
http://www.bt.no/nyheter/utenriks/Solid-enighet-omAutenrikspolitikken-1839944.html, accessed 
7 July 2015. Christian-Marius Stryken et. al., ’Politiske tvangstanker’, Dagbladet, 9 September 
2005, http://www.dagbladet.no/kultur/2005/09/09/442808.html, accessed 7 July 2015.  ’Bred 
enighet om norsk utenrikspolitikk’, NRK, 16 October 2013, http://www.nrk.no/video/PS*127455, 
accessed 7 July 2015     
37 Stryken et. al., ’Politiske tvangstanker’  
38 Samuel Huntington, ’The two worlds of military policy’, in Ulriksen ’Den norske 
forsvarstradisjonen’, p. 21 
39 See statements from then Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre: ’Vil ha mer debatt om norsk 
utenrikspolitikk’, Dagen, 2 September 2008, 
http://www.dagen.no/Innenriks/Vil_ha_mer_debatt_om_norsk_utenrikspolitikk-46315, accessed 
7 July 2015. See also article by Ole Gunnar Skagestad, ’Debatten som stilnet: Hva skal vi med 
forsvaret?’, Minerva, 23 August 2007, http://www.minervanett.no/debatten-som-stilnet-hva-skal-
vi-med-forsvaret/, accessed 7 July 2015 
40 Ulriksen, ’Den norske forsvarstradisjonen’, p. 21 
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been ‘almost surprisingly stable’ [ed. transl.].41 This tradition for continuity in 
the discourse on military matter is important to note when analysing the rate of 
adoption of alternative strategies or viewpoints in military matters in Norway. 
Because this thesis will discuss an alternative strategy and method, 
multinational defence cooperation, and the Norwegian reactions to it, such a 
tradition and characteristic may be important, as it can represent a significant 
force in shaping the discourse over time.  
This apparent consensus would most likely have been challenged when the Cold 
War ended and Norway was faced with massive changes in the prevailing world 
security order. The unification of Germany and the dissolution of its largest 
neighbour, the Soviet Union, made defence planning more challenging than 
during the Cold War. As soon as the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the rationale for 
defence spending was called into question, and many sought to use funds for 
other more benign purposes.42 In January 1990 the government commissioned a 
white paper that was to form the ‘main guiding principles’ of defence planning 
after 1993, as the guidelines for the current period were already established.43 
The resulting Defence White Paper 1990, led by former Prime Minister Kåre 
Willoch, established that Norway now needed to think more in the lines of 
quality over quantity, and shift toward a greater focus on northern Norway. This 
view was also reflected in the Chief of Defence’s (CHOD) Defence Study of 
1991.44 The changing mood regarding defence spending throughout Europe, and 
the evident need to rationalise the army resulted in a steady decline in defence 
spending throughout the 1990s. As seen in the Defence White Paper 2000, the 
1998 budget was about 8% lower than that of 1990,45 which gave the Armed 
Forces significantly less funds to work with considering the effects of eight years 
of inflation. The army was hit with the bulk of the reductions, with its 
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mobilisation force reduced from approximately 180.000 to 100.000,46 a 55% 
reduction. This was dramatic considering that most of the Armed Forces’ 
equipment were obsolete already in the 1980s, and calls for increased rather 
than decreased investment had been voiced shortly before the end of the Cold 
War. In 1985, then Chief of Defence General Bull-Hansen published a report 
stating that in order to realise ‘an adequate national defence’ within the 
alliance, the Armed Forces needed a boost in defence spending of 7% annually.47 
Additionally, later reports indicated that of the 13 Brigades in the Army of 1990, 
only four could be sufficiently equipped for battle, indicating that almost 70% of 
the Army’s contribution to the ‘Invasion Defence’ of 1990 did not have the 
means to fight.48 Consequently, the state of the Army in 1990 meant that the 
money saved by cuts in troop numbers would likely not end up in the Army’s 
budget, but rather be absorbed by subsequent budget cuts. This meant that 
when the budget cuts on the 1990s came, the NAF was already underfunded and 
underequipped. 
The force reductions and budget cuts happened at the same time as the number 
of Norwegian commitments to international military operations, such as those in 
Lebanon, Kuwait, Bosnia and Kosovo, increased dramatically. This put further 
strain on the military in a period of rationalisation and reform.49 Norway’s 
experience in the Balkans illustrated the challenges that faced the Post-Cold 
War NAF: Deployments were slow, the ability to interoperate was inadequate, 
and specialised capabilities and materiel were scarce.50 Further aggravating the 
issue was the significant reduction in annual NATO investment funds directed at 
Norway at the time, down from 1.25 billion NOK on average between 1985 and 
1990, to a meagre ~350 million on average between 1994 and 1999.51 
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These telling signs of a force in need of reform did not necessarily affect the 
state of consensus regarding foreign and defence policy, or create any debate 
resulting in reorientation. The budgets continued to drop, and further cuts were 
approved, and at the same time the command and logistical elements continued 
to increase.52 This effectively led to a continuation of the structure and concepts 
of the Cold War ‘Invasion Defence’, with large command and control elements 
able to lead allied troops. This tells us that Norway had not managed to 
effectively reorient herself despite the change in world order and the new 
demands placed on the NAF during the course of the 1990s. This is perhaps not 
surprising, given that the recommendations of the Defence White Paper of 1990 
recommended a continuation of the ‘Invasion Defence’, and a focusing of the 
military to the north of Norway.53 This focusing to the north represented in 
effect a ‘regional invasion defence [ed. transl.]’, that meant that the Armed 
Forces would defend one region at a time against a strategic assault. By 
adopting this modification of the old ‘Invasion Defence’, the NAF avoided to take 
into account that the traditional threat perception was inaccurate or obsolete.54 
According to Gen. Diesen, this led to an inability to properly implement changes 
that ‘would adapt the Armed Forces to a threat that was fundamentally 
different [ed. transl]’.55  
In hindsight, it is apparent that the assumptions regarding Norway’s security 
during the Cold War did not fit the post-Cold War environment, and her 
insistence on keeping the ‘Invasion Defence’ concept aligned poorly with her 
increasing engagement in international operations. As one regional conflict 
replaced another, at the end of the 1990s Norway had been involved in most of 
them.56 Although participation in international operations was fairly 
commonplace, the frequency of operations within a relatively short timeframe 
as we saw in the 1990s was not. Moreover, Norway was increasingly part of NATO 
and not UN-led operations, a departure from the pre-Cold War era where 
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Norway participated primarily in operations with a UN mandate and leadership.57 
In 1999, changes in the new NATO strategic concept signified the importance of 
international operations, or ‘out-of-area’ operations as they were sometimes 
called. The concept included ‘crisis management’ as one of NATO’s tasks, 
signifying the importance of international operations at the time. This inclusion 
of ‘crisis management’ was based on the premise that: 
The security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of 
military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and often 
difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in 
and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises 
at the periphery of the Alliance, which could evolve rapidly.58 
Given that such tasks would have to be solved ‘case-by-case and by consensus’,59 
and in accordance with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, it was no longer a 
requirement that every ally participated in NATO operations. This was a sharp 
contrast to the dominant idea of the traditional Cold War Article 5 operation, 
where saying no was not an option. Subsequently, since participation was no 
longer mandatory, any country’s participation could arguably represent a metric 
for both the level of loyalty to the Alliance (or the U.S.), ability to fight, and 
willingness to take on risk. Despite the fact that Norway had argued against such 
endeavours during the Cold War, Norway became an active participant in out-of-
area operations from the mid-1990s and onward.60 In the book ‘Norway in 
international operations’ [ed. transl.], Janne Matlary explains that following the 
end of the Cold War, NATO operations became ‘wars of choice’ where 
participation ‘in a way that was seen as useful in American eyes, is important’.61 
The objective, according to Matlary, was to avoid marginalisation and to be seen 
as a participant willing to assume ‘the burden of risk and loss’ [ed. transl.].62 
The assumption is that this was done with reciprocity in mind. ‘Norway 
participated in Afghanistan in order to support a sense of solidarity in NATO that 
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would make it easier for the alliance to commit in the [High North] if necessary’ 
[ed. transl].63 Matlary draws on a quote by Hew Strachan in order to point out 
that such concerns of reciprocity in the relationship to the United States is not 
only a small-nation concern but also concerns greater powers: 
[Great Britain is] not primarily in Afghanistan to address the 
developmental difficulties of the Afghans, nor to tackle the terrorist 
threats to the British homeland at source. Britain is in Afghanistan for 
the same reason it took part in the invasion in Iraq: The Anglo-
American alliance is the corner-stone of British foreign and defence 
policy.64 
Matlary explains that this idea of reciprocity is not limited to Afghanistan but is 
true for the entire period following the end of the Cold War.65 This strategy of 
participation as an investment in future security is arguably based in the world 
of Realpolitik, and does not match the stated political rationale for 
participation. According to politicians at the time, Norwegian participation in 
out of area operations was founded in a moral impetus for humanitarian 
intervention, effectively making military participation seem like an altruistic act 
of compassion far removed from the world of Realpolitik. According to Matlary, 
this was done because it eliminated ‘opposition from the so-called left side of 
Norwegian politics. [ed. transl.]’66 This idea of reciprocity and political horse-
trading will be significant when discussing participation in multinational defence 
cooperation projects later on in the thesis.  
Acknowledging that the reforms of the 1990s had not had the desired effect, 
made visible by at times lacklustre performance in international operations, the 
Ministry of Defence commissioned a new Defence White Paper in 1999 to review 
Norwegian defence policy once more. The report would provide directions for 
the new main course that would guide the evolution of the Armed Forces in the 
future.67 The paper, titled ‘A New Defence’ acknowledged that the political 
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guidance and requirements put forth throughout the 1990s were consistently 
undercut by reduced funding.68 Throughout the 1990s the NAF saw a steady 
decline in activity as a result of both the lack of funds and reduced numbers. By 
1999 the number of conscripts that were trained were down to 50% of 1990-
levels, and the number of exercises for the Home Guard was down to 25%, while 
the number of hours flown on military aircraft was down to 75%.69 Paradoxically, 
the same period saw a steady increase in the number of senior ranking officers 
and corresponding wage expenditure.70 Although the paper refrained from 
hyperbole when describing these developments, it used very strong words when 
describing the developments of the last decade, and the consequences of not 
immediately implementing new reforms: 
The reform process of the 1990s have been by and large a failure, 
despite good intentions and high ambitions. Both the wage costs and 
the proliferation of military infrastructure are at the same level as at 
the end of the Cold War. The Armed Forces organisation is too large 
and daily operations consumes an ever increasing portion of available 
funds. […] To counteract the growing disparities and develop a 
defence that is adapted to the current realities and future demands, 
is not a question of adjustment and rationalisation. It will require 
radical reform. [ed. transl.]71  
Part of the necessity for reform was founded in a growing understanding that the 
new security climate of the post Cold War world was, in fact, fundamentally 
different. The days of Norway being an importer of security, and the Norwegian 
Armed Forces being constructed around the concept of ‘holding time’ were 
seemingly over. Given that the events of 11 September 2001 were only a year 
away, the paper described this acknowledgement in a surprisingly candid and 
foreboding way:  
The restructuring of NATO also presents Norway with new demands 
and challenges. With the security trends in today’s Europe, NATO 
could in the future have to focus even less on situations and 
challenges that have traditionally been central to Norwegian security 
and defence policy. It is also possible that in the long run, NATO could 
become less significant and less able to solve the sum of the tasks it 
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has set out to accomplish, and that Norway may become marginalised 
in such a situation. […] The development of NATO implies greater 
expectations of Norwegian participation in different types of military 
operations and activities outside her closest area in order to 
contribute toward facilitating peace and stability in a broader 
perspective. In addition is the expectation that Norway must, in a 
credible manner, be able to contribute to the traditional collective 
defence of the alliance and also assume a greater responsibility for 
her own security [ed. transl].72  
In 2000, then CHOD Sigurd Frisvold presented the new Defence Study of 2000 
which, together with the Defence White Paper 2000, served as a milestone in 
the development of the post-Cold War Norwegian Armed Forces. Then Brigadier 
General Sverre Diesen led the study team. Diesen focused on an apparent 
disparity between the increasing number of tasks assigned to the military and 
the continued reduction in defence spending.73 He argued that, contrary to 
previous studies that focused on the nations military requirements, the 
‘overarching and limiting factor of [the Defence Study] is the economy’ [ed. 
transl.].74 Arguably, the most critical section of the document is where it 
discusses the strategic rationale of the NAF. It acknowledges that the previous 
strategic rationale was to defend a singular part of the country against an 
invader (the Soviet Union), until Norway’s allies were able to reinforce her. In 
contrast, the new security situation meant that such an invasion was unlikely, 
and the military would now have to respond more quickly to a more diverse 
range of crises. This meant that requirements governing what the NAF needed to 
be able to do would have to change accordingly. Limited funding would render 
Norway unable to develop such abilities, and if funding did not increase, more 
and more money would have to be diverted from investment and procurement to 
maintenance and operations, leading to entire structural elements being cut in 
order to balance the budget.75  
The Defence Study of 2000 recommended sweeping cuts in all branches of the 
military, especially the Army and Navy.76 Reactions were immediate. An entry in 
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the daily Aftenposten 1 November 2000, read: ‘Cuts suggested by Chief of 
Defence causes storm among employees’, with the article claiming that 14 
different units would be removed from the Armed Forces following the 
recommendations of Defence Study 2000.77 General Frisvold commented in the 
same article that a ‘niche defence is possible’, further indicating that the only 
way to balance the budget may be to specialise the military, adding fuel to the 
fire of his critics. Although the suggestions spurred a great deal of debate, it is 
interesting to note that critics never delved into the more fundamental elements 
of Norwegian policy, such as the relationship to and dependence on the U.S. Nor 
did they discuss possible alternatives that were better suited to the new 
requirements. Rather, the critics focused on the negative consequences of the 
suggested cuts for the NAF’s ability to solve its traditional mission, and why their 
own unit was invaluable in this respect.  
Despite pointing to many of the same problems and challenges, the two studies 
were in some areas different. The most telling contrast between the Defence 
Study and the Defence White Paper was the Defence Study’s underlying premise 
that NATO would send reinforcements in the event of crises in addition to war. 
Three out of four scenario models reflected Cold War thinking in major ways, 
structuring the military in a way requiring it to be reinforced, regenerated or to 
act as part of an Allied operation.78 Absent from the Defence Study was the 
possibility for increased use of multinational defence cooperation. The Defence 
White Paper touched on this briefly in its section on the ‘Nordic dimension’.79 
The paper states that there are several important factors that promote a more 
active policy of integration by Norway with regard to its Nordic neighbours, most 
notably shared interests, geography and threat perception could pave the way 
for cooperation in procurement and other areas. It even went so far as to 
suggest the possibility of multinational units in a Nordic framework. The fact 
that Sweden and Finland were not NATO countries, however, was seen as a 
major hindrance to further integration: ‘As long as the nations have differing 
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connections to NATO and the EU, this will serve as a limiting factor for the 
continued development of this cooperation.’80  
The Defence White Paper further emphasises the importance of NATO and 
nurturing the relationship with the U.S., saying in line with the traditional 
perceptions of Norwegian security: ‘Membership in NATO is steadfast, and will 
for the foreseeable future remain the cornerstone of Norwegian security and 
defence policy.’81 Despite this emphasis, the paper does acknowledge that the 
importance of the EU for European security may increase if the U.S. shifts its 
attention elsewhere. Scholars noted that one conclusion that could be drawn 
from this was that we were witnessing an ‘enhanced europeanization of 
Norwegian security politics’.82 Following the accordant descriptions in Defence 
Study 2000 and the Defence White Paper 2000, of a military in dire need of 
funding and reform, the Norwegian parliament passed a budget increasing the 
defence budget by 2.5%, not counting special funding for operations abroad. The 
portion of funds allocated for investment alone was increased by 10.6%, which 
signified that it was generally accepted that the NAF needed significant 
modernisation.83 The Minister of Defence at the time, Kristin Krohn Devold, 
expressed this understanding when interviewed about the proposed changes:  
The military faces large and important tasks as it adapts to tomorrows 
threat scenario, and this is reflected in the newly passed budget. The 
focus is on modernising the military so that we can be safe in the 
future also. [ed. transl.]84  
Despite the budget bump, the other changes proposed by administration did not 
fare as well. When the proposition reached Parliament, the majority in 
Parliament voted to modify it to keep many of the structural elements that were 
suggested disbanded. One opposition party went so far as to accuse the 
administration of wanting to ‘raze’ the NAF, calling the other parties to rally in 
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support of a modification to the proposal.85 The resulting compromise focused 
mainly on the Navy, but also the Home Guard, the mainstay of the old ‘Invasion 
Defence’ was maintained at current numbers.86 It is not clear whether the 
politicians were motivated by tradition or Cold War thinking, or if the 
compromise was simply a political horse trade. Notwithstanding, the studies of 
2000 suggested that the NAF was in a state of crisis, the reforms that were 
proposed were in the end not implemented due to lack of political will. This 
meant that the NAF would have to maintain a larger force than it really wanted. 
In the years following the compromise, from 2003 to 2005, the military 
leadership faced scandals and criticisms calling into question how the military 
spent its money. The Office of the Auditor General rejected the military’s 
accounts for the fiscal year of 2003, and in a press release the office explained 
that the military ‘lacked internal control’ and ‘violated existing regulation’.87 In 
2004, the Norwegian military spent approximately 1 Billion Norwegian Kroner 
(NOK) more than they were allocated, causing media outcry. The daily 
newspaper ‘Dagbladet’ wrote:  
The military is heading toward a gigantic budget bust of 1 Billion 
Kroner for 2004. The Ministry of Defence and the Defence Staff is 
working around the clock to confirm the numbers. [ed. transl.]88  
The MoD responded quickly and produced two significant publications in 2005 
and 2006 describing immediate action, 89 adding descriptions of the economic 
control process in the organisation.90 Additionally, measures to increase cost-
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effectiveness to the order of NOK 1.4 billion was also initiated.91 One could say 
that this situation mirrored Ulriksen’s argument that when the gap between 
requirements and practice becomes too great, turmoil ensues. The attention 
directed at the military at the turn of the millennium can certainly be 
characterised as turmoil. However, the bulk of the attention concerned 
mismanagement of funds, despite the fact that Parliament passed a military 
organisation larger than the military wanted. The situation indicated quite 
clearly that the process of reform was a painful one. 
As we have seen, the reform of the Norwegian Armed Forces from 1990 to 2005 
had been considerable and ineffective at the same time. When the Cold War 
ended, the Norwegian Armed Forces had for years required significant 
investments in order to be able to field an effective ‘Invasion Defence’, which 
would be the Norwegian response to a major conflict in during the Cold War. In 
the period, there were two major reform cycles, one in 1990-91 and one in 2000. 
In 1990, the old ‘Invasion Defence’ concept was largely continued, despite the 
fact that the effects of the end of the Cold War, and despite the indications that 
the Armed Forces were unable to field the force required of the concept. Budget 
cuts and rationalisation efforts were proposed and implemented, and at the 
same time, the Armed Forces had to field troops for various international 
operations, that put even more strain on the military. Consequently, problems 
compounded. In 2000, two studies pointed out that the NAF was significantly 
underfunded, and that the old ‘Invasion Defence’ was no longer a suitable 
concept for Norwegian needs. 
The 1990 reform retained old concepts that were arguably outdated, leading to 
reduced force numbers, discontinued bases and structural elements, but no 
fundamental discussion on what threats existed or how to counter them. The 
2000 reform attempted to correct some of the imbalance between funding and 
ambition, but although the military was modernised, it wasn’t really reformed,92 
and reforms were only partially implemented. The demands on the NAF mounted 
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after the first years of the new millennium, and trying to balance the budget 
brought about huge challenges, as seen in 2004. Furthermore, the enduring role 
of NATO and Norway’s relationship with the United States was not revisited, 
giving the process an even greater sense of a purposeful continuation of the 
existing order, rather than significant change. This continuation can perhaps be 
a result of the development of an axiom regarding how the NAF should be 
structured, and what threat it was supposed to face. This axiom dictated that 
the Armed Forces had to be as large as possible in order to counter an invasion 
from Russia. At the same time, the Armed Forces would participate in 
international operations so as to be seen as a loyal ally, worthy of future support 
should she need it. The fact that the events of the 1990s occurred with little or 
no debate, strengthens this perspective. Especially in the political opposition, 
the lack of willingness to depart from the old concepts most likely contributed 
to the reform cycle of 2000 being significantly hampered. 
When Sverre Diesen was appointed General and Chief of Defence in December 
2004, the Ministry appointed not only an officer but a published writer and 
military theorist,93 with his own ideas of what the main challenges of the Armed 
Forces were, and how to tackle them. Gen. Diesen has described his thinking in 
his book Fornyelse eller forvitring: Forsvaret mot 2020.94 Gen. Diesen felt that 
the reforms that were carried out after the end of the Cold War failed to 
succeed in two areas: Firstly, the process did not sufficiently take into account 
the multifaceted effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union. In a speech in Oslo 
Military Society in November 2005, the general was very critical of what he 
regarded as: 
[T]he highly simplified understanding that one can see on occasion in 
the military debate, namely that the difference between the old 
threat of invasion and the current situation is that the conventional 
threat today is of the same character as before, only with a decreased 
likelihood. [ed. transl]95 
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According to Gen. Diesen this practice contributed greatly to a military 
organisation that was too large, and he accused the administration, and 
Parliament, of not assuming responsibility for their actions. In his mind, if the 
government avoided implementing cuts suggested by officers and experts, they 
would have to compensate by allocating money to fill the gap that they had 
created.96 This did not happen, effectively ignoring the warnings of Defence 
Study 2000. Moreover, Gen. Diesen believed that certain trends in the 
development of military technology that applied to all nations, created 
challenges for any Armed Forces that had seen their troop numbers and 
structures reduced. The trend was the technology-driven rise in cost of military 
materiel, and the consequence was critical mass. These issues shaped Gen. 
Diesen’s thinking when he assumed office, I will explain them below.  
Rising investment cost of military technology – ‘Techflation’ 
With the implementation of computers and ever-increasing technological 
sophistication into even the most mundane of military hardware, the cost of 
such hardware has increased dramatically during the course of a few decades. 
An obviously exaggerated way of demonstrating this is Norman Augustine’s 16th 
law. This law states rather absurdly that if you extend the upward trend in 
procurement cost of combat aircraft, in 2054 the entire U.S. military budget will 
be sufficient to buy one aircraft. And as he says humorously:  
This aircraft will have to be shared by the Air Force and Navy three 
and a half days per week, except for leap year, when it will be made 
available for the Marines for the extra day.97  
Mr Augustine’s laws may be written tongue-in-cheek, but he does have the 
numbers to back it up, drawing a line from the Kitty Hawk all the way to the F-
15 Eagle and the F-16 Fighting Falcon.98 The most recent examples of combat 
aircraft like the F-22 Raptor, which has an estimated procurement cost per 
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aircraft of almost $370 million fits nicely into such projections.99 The problem 
extends not only to the tip-of-the spear type of equipment such as combat 
aircraft, submarines or aircraft carriers. The rising cost is for all types of 
equipment. A contemporary example of this trend is that the United Kingdom is 
estimated to spend 4% more in total on equipment in 2015 compared to 2014, 
which is a massive increase in a single year.100 The pace of technological 
development also means that state-of-the-art equipment purchased today will 
become surpassed by new and vastly improved equipment in a much shorter span 
of time than similar equipment 50 years ago. 
This rising cost of military equipment is an interesting divergence from non-
military technology, which has seen the same amount of technological 
development but nowhere near the same increase in cost. This may be 
attributed to the fact that military technology is often bespoke, and produced in 
relatively small quantities. This was less of a problem during the Cold War when 
cost was secondary to performance, now we see a very different picture.101 
Because of the rise in cost, maintaining the same number of combat aircraft, to 
use that as an example, becomes impossible. For most Armed Forces, the 
solution is to cut down the number so that cost parity is achieved,102 which leads 
to a new problem all in itself: Critical mass. 
Imbalanced tooth-to-tail ratio and the problem of critical mass 
Tooth-to-tail ratio is an expression that has been increasingly popular in recent 
years. In short the expression relates to the ratio of combat vs. non-combat 
personnel in the armed forces, discriminating very distinctly which type of troop 
belongs in the combat or non-combat category.103 Typically the non-combat 
category has been comprised of logistical functions such as transport, food, 
housing and similar support structures, while the combat category has been 
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comprised of any unit tasked with fighting the enemy. The debate is regularly 
centred on how many non-combatants you have to have to put one combatant 
into combat, and some also include the number of civilians employed by the 
military.104  
This ratio can be used by militaries as a measurement of combat effectiveness if 
one accepts the premise that more tooth equals more combat effectiveness. If 
one nation needs 20 non-combatants to field one troop, and another needs only 
10, you can say that the latter is more effective at fielding troops, as it has a 
tooth-to-tail ratio of 1:10 versus the former’s 1:20. Now as nations attempt to 
be more effective, they try to reduce the amount of ‘tail’ required to conduct 
operations. This can involve trimming down the ‘fluff’ of support operations, 
rendering only the most important aspects of support operations left.105 The 
term is not unproblematic. Critics have called the term ‘archaic’ and ‘blatantly 
misused’ because the term oversimplifies a complex organisation into only two 
parts, leaving too much room for discussion about what actually constitutes 
teeth and tail.106 Because of the steadily decreasing defence budget allocations 
after the Cold War, nations like Norway have been forced to cut much of their 
combat force, or ‘tooth’, in addition to the support structures that accompany 
them.  
From a tooth-to-tail standpoint, scaling down combat and non-combat troops 
equally makes no difference. If you remove one non-combatant for every 
combatant the ratio remains the same. However, if you continue scaling back, 
even if you scale back 1:1, you will eventually encounter the issue of critical 
mass. Critical mass means you cannot reduce the size of your forces, be it a 
single capability or a whole branch, infinitely without having to get rid of it all 
together. Eventually, you will reach the minimum level of support structures 
required to field even a single troop. As Diesen points out:  
The military, as any other large organisation, cannot be scaled down 
all the way to zero, and still retain a proportion of its strength and 
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firepower. It is not as if a military which is 10% of what it used to be 
retains 10% of its effectiveness. On the contrary, the reality is that 
when your forces drop below a certain minimum volume, the 
effectiveness of your force structure is reduced dramatically and the 
unit cost of each capability increases almost exponentially. The 
reason for the increasing unit cost is the fact that your support 
functions cannot be reduced at the same rate as the number of 
weapon systems and platforms, consequently the cost of support and 
logistics make up and increasing part of the total, hence the sharp 
increase in unit costs as the number of units of each capability 
dwindle [ed. transl.]107  
The key word here is base cost. The fact that any capability carries with it a 
base cost no matter how many units of each capability you possess. This issue 
presents itself both when you are trying to improve your tooth-to-tail ratio, and 
when you are trying to reduce cost by scaling down the size of your defence 
structure as a whole. You reach a point where you cannot remove any more 
support structures without rendering the entire capability ineffective due to lack 
of support. Eventually the process also makes little sense in an economic 
standpoint due to the fact of the inevitable mounting per-unit cost.  
In order to bring about potential solutions to these problems, General Diesen 
initiated two major studies that I will describe more closely in the next chapter. 
However, it is useful to keep in mind General Diesen’s goals for the process he 
was about to undertake: 1) Avoid having Parliament passing a larger force than it 
was financing. This meant that the Armed Forces would have to be able to 
maintain and renew the force with the passed budget. 2) Ensure that defence 
budgets grew in such a way that it maintained a stable purchasing power for the 
Armed Forces. This to account for cost developments in what Diesen calls the 
‘special’ defence market, which refers to the phenomenon of ‘techflation’ that I 
have described above. 3) Create an acceptance among politicians for a more 
profound and peremptory defence cooperation with other small and medium 
sized countries.108 As my thesis is centred around MDC I will look at Diesens two 
studies, and the events that followed them, with MDC in mind.  
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2 Nordic Defence Cooperation 
In this chapter I will describe the NORDEFCO framework, its origin, inner 
workings and how Norway has approached the framework. I will discuss whether 
or not the framework is the most comprehensive cooperation effort among the 
Nordic militaries to date, and if it really represents a departure from the 
previous initiatives that were prevailing in the Cold War and 1990s. I will try to 
detail the ambitions of the framework, and the underlying premises that 
motivated its founders. I will also describe some of its challenges and some of its 
successes, which can tell us something about the dynamics between the nations 
involved. Furthermore, I will discuss Norway’s goals and ambitions for the 
framework, both in government documents, behaviour in the framework, and 
ambitions voiced by high-level politicians. My goal is to give a clear presentation 
of what NORDEFCO is, what motivated its foundation, and how Norway 
approaches NORDEFCO. 
Nordic cooperation before NORDEFCO 
Nordic cooperation, not only in defence, has faced numerous challenges since 
World War II. As Riste noted in his work on Norway’s Foreign Relations:  
Nordic cooperation had a built-in advantage due to geographic 
nearness, strong cultural affinities, and very similar languages, and a 
number of limited cooperative ventures saw the light of day under the 
aegis of the Nordic Council. But attempts to go beyond practical 
collaboration to schemes that smacked of integration tended to 
awaken ghosts from past history, such as Sweden’s leadership 
aspirations, or Norway’s fear of being dominated by her erstwhile 
union partners.109 
In addition to such fears and aspirations, the Nordic countries were very much a 
part of the larger state of play in the Cold War. This limited their room to 
manoeuvre and rendered them with ‘little choice during the Cold War years but 
to accept the policy consequences of being part of the East–West divide.’110 
However, the topic of a Scandinavian or Nordic alliance surfaced both after 
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World War II and after the end of the Cold War, and major powers such as Great 
Britain entertained the notion on both occasions.111 To explain why any such 
arrangements failed to materialise would be a thesis in an of itself, but as Alyson 
Bailes indicates for the post World War II arrangement, it was clear that ‘the 
Swedish square peg simply would not fit in the round hole to let the Nordic pact 
materialize’.112 
When the Soviet Union crumpled, so did the taboo on discussing foreign policy in 
the Nordic Council.113 However, it soon became evident that the countries still 
lacked the ability to pull in the same direction.114 The list of initiatives that were 
launched during the course of the nineties is long, and most were met with 
scepticism in the Norwegian military establishment. Initiatives such as the 
‘Stand-By High Readiness Brigade’ (SHIRBRIG)115 and the ‘Nordic Coordinated 
Arrangement for Military Peace Support’ (NORDCAPS)116, exemplify how the 
differing priorities and allegiances of the Nordic countries hamper collective 
effort.117 A later foreign minister joint article, published in a Swedish daily in 
2010, noted that Nordic cooperation, despite enjoying a high degree of 
consensus regarding initiatives that affect the Nordic region ‘is characterised by 
good intentions, not concrete action [ed. transl.]’.118 Norwegian researcher 
Håkon Lunde Saxi attributes this admission of inaction to the fact that while the 
Nordic countries aspire towards cooperation in ‘high politics’, historically they 
have seen a much greater degree of success in cooperating in ‘low politics’, 
areas such as labour migration and cultural exchange.119 While the results of 
Nordic military cooperation undercut its ambition, some progress was made 
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during the course of the 1990s, attributed to Sweden’s involvement in NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative, as well as the Nordic countries 
participating in ever more direct action in various international operations in 
former Yugoslavia.120  
Although the Nordic dimension was increasingly present in Norwegian policy and 
military operations during the course of the 1990s and past the turn of the 
century, the focus for both the Norwegian Armed Forces themselves and the 
broader Norwegian public was not centred on such cooperation as a major way 
of reforming the Armed Forces. When General Sverre Diesen became CHOD, he 
brought the idea to the forefront of the discussion, primarily through two 
studies, the Possibilities Study of 2007 and the Defence Study of 2007. 
The Possibilities Study 
In the fall of 2006, Gen. Diesen, along with his counterpart in Sweden Håkan 
Syrén, commissioned a study to ‘explore the possibilities for developing mutually 
beneficial cooperation along the entire breadth of the Swedish and Norwegian 
military structure.’121 The study was completed in August 2007, and contained a 
large number of specific suggestions for cooperation between the two countries. 
According to Diesen, the idea of carrying out this study with Sweden was 
founded simply in the fact that the two countries were of comparable size and 
therefore experienced many of the same problems.122 The study, dubbed 
‘Mulighetsstudien’ (Possibilities Study), gave a sense of urgency to the 
implementation of MDC by stating that:  
[L]imited economic resources and transnational security challenges 
make multinational defence cooperation an imperative to securing a 
long-term balance between tasks and economy for the defence 
powers. [ed. transl.]123  
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With such a starting point, it is obvious that this study would not discuss whether 
there were any avenues for cooperation, but rather which ones the two 
countries should focus on.  
The study was military-oriented in that it focused on specific capabilities, 
specific materiel and specific elements of military short and long-term planning 
for the two countries. One of its most important premises was that the process 
of rationalising the Armed Forces has progressed to a point where ‘several 
structural elements are approaching critical mass [ed. transl.]’.124 To alleviate 
the problems relating to critical mass, the Possibilities Study indicated that 
international cooperation could be one method of mitigating the critical mass 
problem. The study focused on select primary areas for cooperation for each 
branch of the military:125  
Army 
1) Joint training of specialists  
2) Joint procurement, updates and renovation of materiel 
a. Joint procurement of Archer artillery and Combat Vehicle 90  
3) Joint force for use in international operations 
a. This included a possible joint high-readiness force 
Navy 
1) Joint procurement of submarines 
a. This included coordinating the timing for procurement and also the 
type of boat 
2) Joint minesweeping capability 
3) Joint use of logistics vessels 
a. This included the possibility of joint procurement in the future 
4) Joint exchange of sea surveillance information 
Air Force 
1) Joint use of C-130 Hercules 
a. Establishment of a joint main air base for the aircraft 
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2) Cooperation on NH-90 Transport helicopter 
a. Coordination of logistical support 
b. Colocation of helicopters  
3) Joint air exercises and joint use of national airspace 
4) Joint exchange of air surveillance information 
a. This required approval from NATO, but the study suggested that 
joint training of personnel could be carried out regardless 
The study also contained suggestions for cooperation on several projects of a 
lesser degree of intricacy and political flammability, such as higher education, 
R&D, gender issues and more.126 The sheer amount of suggestions for integration 
in the study is surprising, and a large portion of the primary areas of cooperation 
included suggestions of colocation of forces, integration of logistical elements 
and coordinated long-term planning for the entire range of materiel.  
Defence Study of 2007 
Gen. Diesen filed the Defence Study 2007 in November 2007,127 just three months 
after the Possibilities Study. Traces of the three goals that Gen. Diesen had set 
out to achieve were obvious already in the first few paragraphs of the study’s 
end report. Here, the report proclaimed the definitive death of the old ‘Invasion 
Defence’, and detailed how this was necessary due to the fact that the old 
structure would be ‘a less than rational response to today’s security 
challenges’.128 The importance of Norway’s ability to participate in NATO-
operations was also highlighted early on, furthering the argument that the old 
preoccupation with quantity over quality had to be reversed.129 In order to 
achieve the economic goals that Gen. Diesen outlined, referred to in the report 
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as ‘long-term financial balance’,130 the report stated that the following 
structural measures would have to be completed: 
• A significant rationalisation of the base structure and concentration of the 
Armed Forces in fewer places 
• An extensive commitment to multinational cooperation, especially in 
logistics, training and exercises and support elements 
• A necessary reduction of combat units by cutting the least critical or 
important elements 
• Development and reinforcement of the combat units that are especially 
important and valuable 
• Maximum exploitation of the Armed Forces’ materiel by allowing fully 
trained (read: not conscripts) troops man the equipment131 
 
On the security situation and threat environment, the study devoted a large 
section to explaining exactly what types of conflicts should be defining the 
structure of the Armed Forces, based on what it regarded as the ‘power and 
‘Realpolitikal’ state of affairs in our part of Europe’ [ed. transl.].132 The 
underlying premise that the study sought to establish was that the Armed Forces 
should be structured to ‘secure a capacity for solving the minimum of tasks that 
a sovereign state should be able to solve without allied help [ed. transl.]’133 This 
would act as a deterrent, dissuading states wanting to use force to impose their 
will on Norway. If Norway was able to achieve this minimum level, the idea was 
that any aggressor would have to use such a great degree of force to achieve its 
goals, that the ensuing situation would most likely be severe enough to warrant 
an allied response.134 This focus on the capability for independent operations was 
a departure from the thinking behind the ‘Invasion Defence’, or of participation 
in out-of-area operations as a means to ensure reciprocity, where the 
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responsibility for Norwegian security were firmly placed in allied hands. 
Moreover, the study discussed what form aggression toward Norway could 
assume in conflicts to come. The study claimed that, compared to the spearhead 
attack with a massive follow-on invasion from the Soviet Union that was 
expected during the Cold War, conflicts of the future would be ‘radically 
different’. Future conflicts would, according to the study, have the following 
characteristics: 
1. The conflict would be the result of small, regional disagreements 
2. There will be isolated and limited use of force from the aggressor in order 
to put pressure on the government to alter course in the matter 
3. The operation (the response) will have to be carried out on short notice 
4. Conquering and holding territory will not be an objective for any party 
5. The conflict will primarily be limited to the air and sea domains135 
 
The study goes on to explain specific cuts and restructurings that would be 
necessary in order to create a force that could meet such a threat, focusing on 
standing rather than reserve or conscription-based units, and reducing or 
removing several structural elements, particularly the Home Guard.136 Moreover, 
the study laid out a dramatic timeline of what would have to be done with the 
NAF given a flat budgetary development, only adjusting for inflation, until 2028. 
The conclusion stated dryly: ‘If must be pointed out that if a political decision is 
made to maintain the current budgetary level, one has, in reality, also decided 
to disband our military defence.’ [ed. transl.]137 It is not hard to argue that this 
most likely was a scare-tactic to force the politicians to increase the budget. 
The Defence Study 2007 mirrored the Possibilities Study with regard to the 
challenges of critical mass and multinational defence cooperation’s role in 
solving these challenges, as seen in the following quote: 
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Most small and medium-sized countries are experiencing an increased 
pressure on the defence economy, resulting in smaller structural 
volume. Many countries are experiencing that the number of military 
capabilities in certain areas have been so significantly reduced, and 
that the size of some structural elements are approaching a level that 
is approaching critical mass. At the same time, a larger proportion of 
the force is being used in operations, resulting in increased attrition 
on personnel and materiel. [ed. transl.]138 
By pointing out that a sufficient depth and breadth of MDC was necessary to 
realise the potential of cooperation efforts, it seems likely that Gen. Diesen 
expected resistance in this area. Such a resistance is understandable given the 
Defence White Paper 2000’s emphasis on sovereign freedom of action when 
engaged in MDC.139 Defence Study 2007 recommended colligating the defence 
planning processes of Norway and Sweden based on the recommendations of the 
possibilities study, something that would almost certainly conflict with the 
desire for sovereign freedom of action. The reactions to Defence Study 2007 
were vocal and in a familiar format. Newspaper articles in large types scolded 
Gen. Diesen for his suggested cuts, calling the study ‘the Chief of Defence’s 
death list’140 and ‘a gloomy read’.141 Others suggested that Gen. Diesen would 
end up making Norway’s national defence ‘history’,142 due to the large number 
of cuts he suggested. As in debates of the past, the discussion in the major 
newspapers did not incorporate MDC or the role of security guarantees. As in 
2000, most critics focused on the negative consequence for the NAF’s ability to 
function in an ‘Invasion Defence’-scenario. 
The Defence Minister at the time, Espen Barth-Eide, did acknowledge the 
emphasis and potential that the Possibilities Study and Defence Study 2007 
placed on MDC. In a speech in the Defence College in September 2007, just 
before the Defence Study was published, he pointed out that ‘several projects 
currently outside the scope of national defence budgets could be realised 
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jointly. At the same time, counter arguments of cooperation have been 
weakened.’ [ed. transl.]143 This acknowledgement paved the way for the MDC 
initiatives to come. 
The founding of NORDEFCO 
In June 2008, the Nordic Foreign Ministers met in Luxembourg and agreed to 
commission a study to ‘look into how Nordic cooperation in the area of foreign 
and security policy can be developed over the next 10-15 years’.144 They tasked 
former Norwegian Foreign Minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg, with conducting the 
study, which would be presented in February 2009.145 The report, dubbed ‘The 
Stoltenberg Report’ presented 13 areas of cooperation that could include all the 
Nordic countries. The cooperation areas included maritime surveillance, joint 
military task forces and more.146 While working on the report, Stoltenberg visited 
the various Nordic countries several times, and learned that the thoughts and 
ideas about the situation in the Nordic was by and large the same. All the Nordic 
nations wanted to strengthen Nordic cooperation as they found their interests 
and strategic position to be very similar. They also felt that because of the 
increasing of their role as producers and facilitators for the petroleum industry, 
the region had seen an increase in strategic importance.147 
The report suggested several purely military areas of cooperation that can be 
characterised as deep-level cooperation, mirroring the recommendations of the 
Defence Study 2007. Cooperation areas such as joint task forces and shared 
surveillance both require some degree of integration and mutual dependence 
that would, if implemented, represent a new direction for Norway. This is 
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especially so seeing as prior reports recommended against such concessions or 
dependencies.148  
Before Mr Stoltenberg submitted his report, the Nordic countries signed yet 
another Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) regarding defence cooperation 
named ‘Nordic Supportive Defence Structures’ (NORDSUP) in the fall of 2008.149 
With NORDSUP, the governments wanted:  
[T]o provide a framework for cooperation between the Participants in 
the field of capability development based on the principles of mutual 
interest, equality, reciprocity and sovereignty.150  
During this process, Gen. Diesen continued to put pressure on the politicians to 
get serious about Nordic cooperation. During a debate in Oslo, where the 
commanding officers of Finland, Sweden and Norway were all present, strong 
support for Nordic cooperation was voiced by all parties, and a clear message 
was given to the politicians from Gen. Diesen when he said: ‘It is now time to 
demonstrate will.’ [ed. transl.]151  
Following the Stoltenberg Report, the Nordic governments came together in 
November of 2009, and signed an MoU for what would become the NORDEFCO 
framework.152 This effectively terminated the many and fragmented frameworks 
for Nordic defence cooperation, uniting them under the singular NORDEFCO 
umbrella. Although the Stoltenberg Report represented a significant nudge 
toward cooperation, there is a clear impression that the drive to create 
NORDEFCO was in a large part because of the Possibilities Study and the efforts 
of Gen. Diesen. Inge Kampenes, who has lead the capabilities area of 
cooperation in NORDEFCO, believes Gen. Diesen was very influential in this 
respect:  
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Diesen, in his period, was a very active force for cooperation as a 
solution. He was oriented toward the Nordics, and the driving factor 
in the development of NORDEFCO from NORDCAPS and NORDACS. It 
became something more because of his push. [ed. transl.]153 
The workings of the NORDEFCO framework 
Intention 
The stated intention of the framework was relatively ambitious, and changed 
little from 2009 to 2014. The NORDEFCO MoU of 2009 outlined goals for the 
collaboration, citing the desire for the framework to be ‘comprehensive’ and 
that it would ‘strive for optimum resource allocation’.154 The first annual report 
from the framework went further, stating that its reason d’etre was to ‘produce 
national military capabilities in a more cost-efficient way’.155 Mirroring the 2010 
report, version two of the ‘Guidelines for NORDEFCO military level operating 
procedures’ (GUNOP) from 2011 stated that the framework was to ‘strengthen 
the participant’s national defence’, and also ‘increase the quality in the 
production of operational capabilities’,156 further emphasising that the objective 
was to produce capabilities in addition to facilitating cooperation. Later reports 
also repeated such statements, indicating that the intent has been in agreement 
since NORDEFCO’s foundation.157 In addition to these military-level intentions, 
the Ministers of Defence published a statement in December 2013 outlining its 
vision for the framework toward 2020.158 Although it did not contain any 
significantly new information, compared to the annual reports and the 
associated action plans, the statement did contain a desire to further integrate, 
exemplified by the following paragraph: 
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By 2020 the Nordic countries will have deepened their capability 
cooperation with the aim to increase systems similarity, including 
armaments, interoperability and shared solutions to identified 
capability gaps and shortfalls. Possibilities for pooling of capabilities 
and resources will be actively sought and the principles created for 
Nordic Tactical Air Transport (NORTAT) will serve as an example also 
for other cooperation areas.159 
Although it makes no mention of integration specifically, the fact that system 
similarity and interoperability is emphasised indicates that the nations wanted 
to facilitate integration. 
Inner workings 
The NORDEFCO structure is divided into a political level and a military level. The 
political level is headed by the Ministers of Defence of all the Nordic countries, 
with a Policy Steering Committee as its managing body, with ministerial 
meetings twice a year.160 The military level is headed by the Chiefs of Defence, 
with a Military Coordination Committee (MCC) as its managing body, comprised 
of flag officers appointed by the respective CHODs.161 Norway assumed the chair 
of the MCC in 2010; and the responsibility of chair has rotated annually among 
the nations.162 The MCC sets priorities and describes deliveries within the 
NORDEFCO framework through an Action Plan. This Action Plan is revised and 
published annually, however every Action Plan covers a period of four years. In 
addition to the Action Plan, the GUNOP describes guidelines for NORDEFCO 
military level operating procedures, and has been published for use within the 
framework.163 Revised multiple times in the short lifespan of the framework, the 
‘GUNOP’ details the framework all the way from the basic intention to principles 
for naming of activities.164   
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The MCC also oversees a Coordination Staff (CS), whose function is to support 
the MCC in conducting meetings on that level, functioning as an ‘essential link 
between the policy-level decision-making body and the MCC’.165 The CS has 
several support groups to assist it in its work concerning select topics. These 
groups are focused on methodology, legal and technical questions.166 CS also 
manages and supports five ‘Cooperation Areas’, abbreviated COPAs. The COPAs 
are responsible for ‘leading, managing and implementing the decisions made by 
the MCC’.167 The five COPAs are: 
1. Cooperation Area Capabilities (COPA CAPA)168 
a. COPA CAPA addresses the Nordic countries’ development plans and 
processes. Based on common needs, COPA CAPA identifies areas of 
mutual benefit with the intent of exploring the possibilities of 
reducing total costs and promoting operational effectiveness  
2.  Cooperation Area Human Resources & Education (COPA HR&E) 
a. COPA HRE attempts to achieve an enhanced cooperation on 
military education within the Nordic countries, and facilitate the 
exchange of experiences between Nordic countries on policies and 
procedures in Human Resources & Education. The timeframe for 
the work is 1-10 years  
3. Cooperation Area Training & Exercises (COPA TR&EX) 
a. COPA TEX coordinates and harmonizes military training activities 
among the NORDEFCO countries and facilitates a combined and 
joint exercise plan for a continuation of five years  
4. Cooperation Area Operations (COPA OPS) 
a. COPA OPS is prepared to plan, coordinate and clarify force 
contribution, deployment/redeployment and logistics support to 
operations. In contrast to other COPAs, COPA OPS is event driven  
5. Cooperation Area Armaments (COPA ARMA) 
a. COPA ARMA is to explore the possibility of achieving financial, 
technical and/or industrial benefits for all the member countries 
within the field of acquisition and life cycle support  
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All COPAs have their own COPA Management Group, which is comprised of 
subject matter experts for the various areas.169 The goal of the organisation is to 
be a framework for cooperation rather than an organisational entity. Therefore, 
the regular chains of command assume responsibility for completing tasks and 
activities in the framework.170 The framework divides its work into three 
separate sections: Studies, projects and implemented activities. The NORDEFCO 
organisation assumes responsibility for studies and projects that, when 
complete, are handed down to the chains of command for implementation. The 
studies focus on cost-benefit analyses, while projects serve to assess what needs 
to be done to implement suggestions for cooperation. Keeping the bureaucracy 
side of all these activities to a minimum is a goal for the framework,171 which 
ties into a desire for the process to remain lean and pragmatic.172 
Notable achievements 
Cross-border training 
Cross-border training (CBT) of combat aircraft was one of the earliest fruitions 
of Nordic cooperation that was lauded in NORDEFCO. Established already in its 
first operational year in 2010, CBT became one of the products of the framework 
that politicians turned to when referencing what NORDEFCO could bring to the 
table.173 The CBT project grew from a bottom-up movement from the air wings’ 
need for regular training with aircraft different from their own.174 This was then 
‘pushed through NORDEFCO channels’ in order to facilitate agreements.175 Hailed 
as an initiative that is ‘in the spirit of Nordic Defence Cooperation’, the idea 
behind the CBT initiative is that the combined exercises are conducted with as 
little administration as possible, in any of the three countries air space, without 
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the need for diplomatic clearances in every instance.176 The CBT system is 
divided into two geographic regions, CBT North and CBT South, where the 
northern region holds exercises for Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish aircraft, and 
the southern region holds exercises for Swedish and Danish aircraft.177 The CBT 
has likely benefitted from the changes to European airspace structure that 
occurred in 2005 under the name ‘Flexible Use of Airspace’. The changes were 
implemented by EUROCONTROL, the European governing agency for all air-
traffic operations, requiring all nations to:  
[E]stablish with neighbouring Member States one common set of 
standards for separation between civil and military flights for cross-
border activities.178  
With such a requirement already in place, the road to the Nordic CBT initiative 
is likely to have been much smoother after 2005. This begs the question whether 
CBT came about because of NORDEFCO, or if it would have materialised anyway. 
This is a question that is difficult to answer, but because CBT was one of the 
first projects to reach fruition, it is likely that it was well underway before 
NORDEFCO was founded.  
Nordic Cooperation on Tactical Air Transport (NORTAT) 
This project, although it has not materialised completely, is also often brought 
up as an example of successful cooperation in the Nordic domain. In 2012, the 
Policy Steering Committee stated that: 
Tactical air transport capabilities has the potential to be not only a 
flagship for NORDEFCO but also an icebreaker for other initiatives 
within the NORDEFCO family. At the defence Ministers’ meeting in 
November in Skagen, the Ministers signed a ‘letter of intent’ declaring 
the determination to pursue an ambitious and close cooperation on 
Nordic tactical air transport, including pooling and sharing, common 
training and maintenance. This cooperation project exemplifies the 
fine potential for Nordic cooperation. It was initiated during the 
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Swedish chairmanship, Norway was lead nation, and the letter of 
intent was signed during the Danish chairmanship one year after 
initiation. Expected economic gains and increased operational effect 
are significant.179  
On the surface, this seems like a lofty goal, and the Letter of Intent can be seen 
as a milestone. However, the project is progressing relatively slowly. In 2014, 
the Norwegian Minister of Defence stated: ‘The Nordic Air Transport program, 
NORTAT, is generally progressing according to plan. On the operational side most 
of the milestones have been met.’180 Despite achieving these milestones, the 
most tangible public result of NORTAT, in the span of four years, is the Danish-
Norwegian deal on ‘Life Cycle Support’ for the maintenance of the C-130J 
Hercules transport aircraft. This deal yields savings of about 7%.181 Kampenes 
characterised this contract as ‘massive’, expressing that the 7% saved on 
maintenance was considered significant.182 Progress has yet to be made in areas 
of pooling and sharing or common training, and the maintenance deal still only 
contains two out of four countries in the framework, calling into question the 
‘Nordic-ness’ of the endeavour. 
Major roadblocks 
Failed procurement of the ‘Archer’ self-propelled artillery  
The NORDEFCO annual report of 2010 lauded the Swedish-Norwegian deal to 
jointly procure the Archer artillery system as an example of what could be done 
within the framework of Nordic cooperation.  
The field artillery system Archer: A good example of system similarity, 
enabling significant savings and quality gains by common 
development, logistics and training. Calculations made by the Swedish 
Headquarters estimate savings in the region of 50 million Euros for 
each country, as an effect of sharing the burdens of development 
cost, acquisition and life cycle support. The future possible savings on 
                                         
179 ‘NORDEFCO Annual Report 2012’, p. 20 
180 Ibid., p. 17 
181 Ibid., p. 25 
182 Information from Mr Inge Kampenes, 8 December 2014 
53 
 
common training, logistics, operations etc. are not brought into this 
calculation, and will come as extra bonuses.183  
The project was initially started in 2008, before the foundation of NORDEFCO, 
with a contract being signed in December 2008 for the development of the 
Archer system. The contract contained a Norwegian option to purchase 24 
units.184 For Norway, the Archer system was to replace the old M109 artillery 
system that is set to be phased out in 2020.185 However, the deal encountered 
several issues that highlight the more general challenges facing such initiatives, 
which I will highlight later on. The deal was in the end terminated by the 
Norwegian Minister of Defence, stating in a press release that:  
The government has concluded that the artillery system Archer will 
not fulfil the Armed Forces’ needs within the available time, we are 
therefore withdrawing from the contract.186  
The MoD officially cited issues regarding delays in delivery, due to technical 
difficulties related to firing and ammunition handling, among other issues. The 
termination was a rather abrupt end to a long and very public project, that 
already had seen NOK 500 Million invested in by the Armed Forces. The debacle 
spurned significant media attention, but the fact that the money was wasted 
went largely without notice in Norway, apart from a MoD representative saying 
to the press: ‘we’ll see how much of these funds we can have returned [ed. 
trans]’.187 In Sweden the failed deal received significantly more attention with 
newspaper articles calling the situation a ‘political battle’ between the two 
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countries.188 A Swedish politician attributed the failure to the fact that Norway 
was a NATO member with ‘other priorities than Nordic defence cooperation’.189 
The fact that a project that lasted over such a long period of time could result in 
a cancellation was an obvious setback for the framework.  
National Defence Industry 
In a general sense, the issue of protectionism in relation to national defence 
industry is one of the major issues to any defence cooperation enterprise, be it 
Nordic, NATO or otherwise. There are no politicians saying that NORDEFCO will 
benefit any national industry, they are focusing on the mantra of ‘optimum 
resource allocation’ and cost-effectiveness found in the NORDEFCO MoU. 
However, for the officials working directly on projects within the NORDEFCO 
framework, the story is different as they experience first-hand how the 
countries behave with regard to their industry: 
Sweden has traditionally had a very strong connection to their 
defence industry. It’s hard for us to be a player in that relationship. 
The Swedish position tends to be more in the way of: ‘We have some 
on-going projects in Swedish industry, would you like to take part?’ 
Whereas our own position tends to be one of first deciding what our 
needs are, then finding partners to work with, before finally looking 
for suppliers that could respond to this need.190 
This represents a fundamental difference in approach and of goals for the 
interaction. There is an understandable disparity between the Norwegian and 
Swedish position. This disparity is based on the fact that Sweden has been a 
neutral country for so long, and has therefore had to build up a defence industry 
that covers the entire spectrum of military equipment, whereas Norway in 
comparison only has a niche industry.191 This asymmetry or disparity is one of the 
biggest issues facing the framework, especially for projects that are centred on 
Norway and Sweden. For Sweden to accept a situation of parity between the two 
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countries would be tantamount to accepting that Sweden would have to assume 
a greater burden than Norway,192 which is understandably not desirable. 
Of course, Norway also wants her industry to benefit from deals made with other 
countries within any framework. In a speech at a logistics seminar in 2009, then 
Minister of Defence Anne Grete Strøm-Erichsen referenced a 2006 strategy that 
the Norwegian government produced for collaboration between the government 
and the industry, which had as one of three main goals to strengthen the ability 
for Norwegian industry to partake in international equipment collaboration. The 
Defence Minister was also quoted saying that she considered it ‘right and natural 
that procurement for the NAF resulted in contracts for Norwegian industry [ed. 
trans]’,193 indicating that Norway did indeed consider such priorities in 
negotiations. However, there are no examples that I have been given access to 
that indicate that such considerations have led to deals being scrapped, 
indicating that this is a Swedish problem more than a Norwegian one.  
Norway’s approach to Nordic cooperation 
The Defence White Paper 2007 provides some degree of insight in the thoughts 
and ideas regarding MDC before the advent of NORDEFCO or ‘Smart Defence’. 
The report pointed out that Norwegian participation in various MDC initiatives 
was nothing new, and that Norway had participated in MDC through the NATO 
and UN organisations for decades.194 The authors acknowledged the role of MDC 
as being: 
[…] central to exploit the possibilities of closer cooperation with other 
countries within the full breadth of military matters, from 
development and procurement via education and exercises, to joint 
military capabilities and operations. [ed. transl.]195 
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This acknowledgement gave way to an expression of concern regarding the 
consequences of tight integration with other nations, was also present in the 
Defence White Paper 2000. The main concern was related to an eventual 
‘reduction in national authorities’ freedom of action to utilise their military 
when and where they are needed. [ed. transl.]’196 This concern led the authors 
to conclude that the choice of partners in deep-level MDC was critical in order to 
mitigate some of the challenges involved with such efforts. In addition to the 
importance of the choice of partners, the authors laid down three guidelines 
that they felt should govern the selection process of possible MDC initiatives:197 
• The degree of limitations in Norwegian authorities’ control over the 
capacity and use of Norwegian forces 
• Possibilities for sustainment and development of operational ability and 
sustainable centres of competence 
• Possibilities for economic savings198 
Influences from the Defence White Paper 2007 and the Possibilities Study could 
be seen in the MoD’s proposition 48 (2007-2008) to the Norwegian Parliament 
regarding the next long-term plan for the structuring of the NAF:  
The [Possibilities] study shows that there is a significant potential for 
cooperation with Sweden, with regard to logistics, training, exercises, 
education and several other areas. [ed. transl.]199  
It went on to say: ‘There is an increasing tendency towards European defence 
cooperation and integration. [ed. transl.]’200 This could signify that the 
ministerial level was now more willing to approach new avenues to save money. 
In the proposition, the MoD also reinforced the fact that NATO remained the 
main partner for Norway by saying that any initiatives for cooperation with 
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Sweden (which was the main object for cooperation in the Possibilities Study) 
should only be a supplement to existing agreements for cooperation.201  
In response to such statements, Gen. Diesen continued his efforts in support of 
MDC in the Nordic space. In an article for the Norwegian daily Aftenposten titled 
‘Why Nordic defence cooperation? [ed. transl.]’ Diesen credited prop. 48 with 
acknowledging ‘two determining prerequisites for having Armed Forces in the 
future [ed. transl.]’.202 These prerequisites were firstly ‘that the defence 
budgets have to follow the development of costs in the defence sector [ed. 
transl.]’, and secondly that ‘small nations like Norway – even with a positive 
budget development – can no longer bear the growing costs of maintaining a 
complete military defence alone. [ed. transl.]’203 In Gen. Diesen’s mind the last 
of the acknowledgements meant that the country would have to enter into: 
[L]ong-term strategic partnerships with another state that consist of 
sharing of the costs of military forces and capacity, which are too 
expensive for small nations to maintain on their own. [ed. transl.]204  
He then went on to describe how the Nordic countries in the future would 
become dependant upon one another in order to ‘equip, train and bring forces 
to battle readiness. [ed. transl.]’205 Aware of potential criticism to such 
endeavours due to the role of NATO in Norwegian security policy and the fact 
that Sweden and Finland were not members of NATO, Gen. Diesen presented 
three reasons as to why such integration was in fact acceptable:  
1) No other countries are experiencing the issues now acknowledged by the 
Ministry to such an extent that they would be willing to commit to ‘the 
necessary political and military compromises necessary to make it work [ed. 
transl.]’206 2) The different bases for the Nordic countries’ security policy are of 
‘declining priority compared to the importance of common strategic interests 
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due to common geography [ed. transl.]’207 The ‘Nordic interest community’ [ed. 
transl.]208 was so important according to Gen. Diesen that it was ‘far more 
important than our differing allegiances’ [ed. transl.].209 3) National control of 
training/exercises, supplies is no longer as relevant as before, due to the 
reduced endurance of small states’ armed forces. Gen. Diesen argues that 
because of lacking endurance, whether or not an ammunition depot is in Norway 
or Sweden is of little interest.210 It is interesting to note how far Gen. Diesen 
takes his statements compared to the statements from the Ministry. In all the 
publications available regarding MDC and Nordic cooperation, Gen. Diesen is 
providing the most specific examples of how this could materialise, and provides 
a clear and concise argument for why Norway should commit to such 
cooperation. In his mind, cooperation can only work if you are trying to solve the 
same problems, toward the same end-state, with the same means.  
Although Diesen was a significant voice in the debate, he was the only one at his 
level advocating MDC so strongly. And while his reports and arguments were 
gaining traction in the Ministry, it did not gain the attention of a wider 
audience. Furthermore, there were still few traces of the political momentum 
resulting in MDC becoming a priority for the ministry when discussing the future 
of the NAF. General Diesen left the position as Chief of Defence in 2009, and his 
successor, Harald Sunde, was not as vocal a supporter for extensive measures to 
further cooperation with the Nordic countries. The impending decision to 
procure a new fighter aircraft for the Royal Norwegian Air Force remained the 
major focus for the Defence Minister at the turn of the decade. This discussion, 
along with the question of where the aircraft should be based, dominated the 
debate.211 After Diesen left, he continued to advocate Nordic defence through 
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various newspaper articles,212 and the publication of his book on the 
development of the NAF toward 2020.213  
For the Ministry, it has been an apparent priority to continually maintain that 
despite engagement in NORDEFCO, NATO is the cornerstone of Norwegian 
security. In May of 2009 Strøm-Erichsen stated that some observers have gone 
too far in their interpretations of what the Nordic cooperation efforts really 
meant, feeling the need to reiterate NATO’s importance for Norwegian 
security,214 something her successor also continued doing.215 Such a reassurance 
may be warranted considering how far some have drawn the possibilities in the 
Nordic dimension. A prominent example being the Finnish CHOD Admiral Juhani 
Kaskeala presenting the idea at a defence seminar in 2009, of radical 
specialisation within the Nordic space. He envisioned a scenario where Norway 
assume responsibility for Sea Power, Sweden for Air Power, and Finland for Land 
Power.216 Such fantasies led to strict responses from the U.S., as the American 
ambassador to Norway Benson K. Whitney was quoted saying: ‘the U.S. should 
remind Norway where its security guarantee comes from’.217 This statement 
leaves no room for interpretation, and makes the efforts from the minister to 
reassure onlookers of NATO’s position in Norwegian security thinking 
understandable.  
In late 2010, the Defence Minister departed from the efforts to emphasise 
NATO’s importance for Norway, and presented a rare acknowledgement of 
NORDEFCO’s raison d’être by saying:  
Many countries are experiencing cuts in their defence budgets, and 
more and more countries are seeing how multinational defence 
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cooperation is needed to sustain national defence structures with 
sufficient depth and quality. For a small country such as Norway close 
cooperation with our neighbours is very important. [ed. transl. and 
emphasis]218 
This statement was given on the verge of Norway’s chairmanship of NORDEFCO 
in 2011, which may explain the statement in terms of timing and content. 
Norway’s priorities for her chairmanship were outlined in the annual report for 
2011, where the chairman pointed out that emphasis was given to achieving 
results using a ‘step-by-step strategy rather than an approach that creates high 
expectations of ‘quick wins.’’219 This somewhat cautious approach is also found 
in the ministry’s proposition 73S ‘Et Forsvar for vår tid’ (‘A defence for our time’ 
[ed. transl.]), where previous statements regarding the importance of exploring 
avenues of cooperation in the Nordic space were reiterated, but no specific 
results, initiatives or on-going projects were mentioned.220 Understandable in 
2007, such lack of specific detail of results or priorities were curious in 2012 
considering that the Ministry has had for the last five years expressed, albeit in 
vague terms, high hopes for Nordic cooperation. The Norwegian Armed Forces 
annual report for 2010 provided some insight into the thinking behind the 
Norwegian approach to MDC, indicating that participation could in itself be a 
goal: 
It should be pointed out that for a small country like Norway – and in 
light of a changing security environment – it is in our fundamental 
interest to cooperate closely with both NATO, the EU and the Nordics. 
It is therefore important that we avoid, by conducting cross-
prioritisation, establishing criteria that seem absolute or excluding. 
[ed. transl.]221 
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This may indicate that the motivation of economic savings or gains in capability 
were not the only thing that drove the Ministry’s internal processes on MDC. 
Security policy and the maintenance of relations with both NATO, the EU and the 
Nordics also seems to be of concern, and for good reason. This is further 
amplified later on in the text:  
The motives underlying multinational defence cooperation are 
complex, and multiple factors play a role. Optimal cooperation would 
occur in a situation where both security- and defence policy along 
with military and economic circumstances speak for cooperation. [ed. 
transl.]222  
The document describing how the Armed Forces would implement ‘A defence for 
our time’ was very clear in its formulation of how and with whom Norway should 
cooperate: 
Multinational cooperation in the capability or security policy domain 
shall be especially directed toward close, allied, great powers such as 
the U.S., Great Britain and Germany. Also Holland, Denmark, Iceland 
and the Baltic countries, in addition to our close partners Sweden and 
Finland, shall be given priority. [ed. transl.]223  
From the previous three quotations it is interesting to pose the question: what, 
in the security policy domain, speaks for relying on any other international 
entity than NATO? The conflicting expressions of support for and prioritising of 
Nordic cooperation on one hand, and the need to reassure of NATO’s importance 
to Norwegian security is a dynamic that is interesting, and I will attempt to 
expand on reasons why a closer connection with the Nordics may be useful for 
Norway in a security policy mind frame.  
In the Norwegian Strategic Concept published by the MoD in 2009, called 
‘Capable Force’, the MoD recognised that the threats Norway might face in the 
future could be placed in a grey area between war and peace, giving examples 
ranging from terrorist attacks to attacks on Norwegian sovereignty by another 
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sovereign state.224 The same document also outlined the special legal status of 
Norway’s holdings in the High North, which is referred to not by name but by the 
generic formulation ‘certain geographic areas’. Likely referring to Svalbard, the 
MoD here acknowledges that Norway might be faced with undue pressure from 
nations, namely Russia, wanting to challenge the legal basis for Norwegian 
sovereignty over the archipelago. One example of a conflict that might escalate 
is the conflict over the Fishery Protection Zone around Svalbard, which the 
Russian Government does not recognise. Russian officials have already publicly 
questioned the legality of the zone, saying:  
Norway knows perfectly well that Russia does not recognise the 
Fishery Protection Zone. They are pressuring us by escalating and 
exceeding existing treaties [ed. transl.].225 
The threat assessment for 2011, published by the Norwegian Intelligence Service 
did not indicate that the Russian military posed any immediate threat to 
Norwegian security, but acknowledged the unpredictability of Russia with the 
following: 
However, Russian foreign policy will still be characterised by a lack of 
predictability due to the country’s great power ambitions, lack of 
transparent decision making process, and vulnerable economy. [ed. 
transl.]226 
Because of this lack of predictability, it is possible to assume that the Ministry 
expected that, in the event of a ‘grey-area’ conflict with Russia, support from 
the Nordic countries may be more likely than support from NATO as a whole, or 
any of the major powers individually. I have not been able to verify this 
assumption with my sources, however considering that this was at the time of 
the American ‘pivot’ to Asia, which I will discuss in more depth later on, such a 
reasoning is certainly probable. Moreover, ‘The Nordic Declaration of Solidarity 
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[ed. transl.]’227 of 2011 assures that if either of the Nordic countries were to fall 
victim to ‘natural or man-made disasters, digital attacks or terrorism’,228 the 
other nations would ‘assist by relevant means’.229 This does not encompass any 
‘grey areas’ that Norway might face from Russia, but it is certainly a step 
towards a tighter bond between the countries with regard to security. One 
explanation of Norwegian behaviour could be that she is moving as close as she 
can to the Nordic nations, without compromising her relationship with NATO. 
The narrative of emphasising Nordic cooperation while reaffirming the role of 
NATO in Norwegian security was maintained by the Ministry toward 2014. The 
Defence Ministry’s proposition for the 2014 defence budget explained that: 
Nordic defence cooperation is characterised by a high level of activity 
and good development on all levels. The cooperation is primarily 
divided into two areas. Through close dialogue regarding security 
policy and operations the political roadmap is discussed or 
operationalised. The other area is capability development through 
cooperation on equipment, logistics, education, training and exercises 
[ed. transl.].230  
The text continued by acknowledging that Norway would hold the chair of 
NORDEFCO for the second time in 2014, stating that the goal was to ‘develop the 
cooperation on capabilities and operations further’.231 Bearing in mind that this 
was less than a year after Norway terminated the Archer contract, the text did 
not acknowledge any conflicts or setbacks at all. 
The Norwegian statements regarding Nordic cooperation notwithstanding, 
Norway’s actions spoke louder than words according to Swedish representatives. 
The failed Archer contract and Norway recalling staff officers from the Swedish 
high command in January 2014 were met with disappointment in Sweden. One 
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spokesperson, Allan Widman, claimed that this marked the end of Nordic 
cooperation, because Norway had made it very clear that she does not wish to 
cooperate deeply with non-NATO countries.232 The statements from the Swedish 
spokesperson prompted a reaction from Norwegian politicians as well. In a 
debate in the Norwegian Parliament on 30 January 2014, one opposition 
representative hoped that the Minister would ‘calm our Swedish friends on this 
[…] There cannot be an impression that we do not prioritise cooperation with 
non-NATO countries [ed. transl.]’.233 Another representative queried the Defence 
Minister by asking: ‘what ambitions does the Defence Minister have for the 
Nordic defence cooperation? [ed. transl.]’.234 The Defence Minister, Ine Eriksen 
Søreide, responded to these questions in familiar fashion by avoiding the 
question of Swedish concerns entirely. Rather, she stayed on message by saying 
that Nordic defence cooperation was a ‘success story’, largely because of the 
extent of Norwegian participation, where ‘we have, in 70 different areas, a 
close cooperation both in materiel, exercises, training and other areas. Many of 
them within cooperation on materiel.’ [ed. transl.]235 This could indicate that 
the Minister sees Norway’s goals as achieved due to the level of participation, 
not the economic savings or military output gained. 
Concerns of differing alignments are understandable from both sides of the 
argument. For the Swedish, the Norwegian standpoint means that NORDEFCO 
will never contain the same guarantees of security that members of NATO enjoy. 
For Norway, moving too far toward the Nordics may cause concern regarding 
Norway’s loyalty to NATO. This dilemma is not only a political one because as 
restrictions and caveats are applied, those who are working on projects in 
NORDEFCO find it challenging, as Mr Kampenes explains:  
It is pretty clear that the more you depend on everyone else, with 
differing allegiances - NATO and not NATO, the EU and not the EU, 
EDA and not EDA - it becomes more difficult. People become 
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sceptical, there are too many caveats for anything to happen. It is 
both a political and a military dilemma.236 	
This challenge becomes even more evident the more you move toward combat 
units, as they say in Norway ‘the pointy end (of the spear)’. Work to create a 
joint combat unit, referred to in the NORDEFCO framework as ‘Battalion Task 
Force 2020’,237 has been underway since the beginning of NORDEFCO. Not 
surprisingly, the non-NATO members of NORDEFCO, Sweden and Finland, has 
long supported creating the force, citing that such a force would be used ‘in 
common defence of Finnish, Swedish and other Nordic territories’.238 The NATO 
countries Denmark and Norway, however, has expressed scepticism. My source 
was able to expand on this: 
We have done a study over three years named ‘Battalion Task Force 
2020’, where we looked at the possibility to combine and build up 
forces, in order to field a Nordic integrated ‘Battalion Task Force’. It 
simply became too complicated. You know, [combat units] are 
controversial in a political sense, and when you have soldiers inside 
and outside of the Alliance, it becomes even more controversial and 
complicated. It is difficult enough doing this in Afghanistan at the 
company level. We ended up taking this step-by-step, by planning a 
combined exercise in 2016 with [a task force] in mind.239 
This inability to produce a joint task force adds insult to injury for observers in 
Norway hoping to see definitive output from the NORDEFCO framework. Along 
with the Archer incident and slow progress of NORTAT, the list of 
disappointments of a public nature grows longer than the list of public 
successes. This makes it easy for those who would criticise and say that Norway 
is not doing the right thing, enough of the right things, or that Norway’s 
approach to all this is wrong. What is interesting to note is that despite having 
two different coalition governments and five different defence ministers since 
2009,240 the Norwegian approach seems steady: Emphasise participation in the 
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NORDEFCO framework, but reiterate NATO’s role as our prime security 
guarantor.  
When comparing the goals and potential that were described in the Possibilities 
Study, it is obvious that in the seven years that followed the publication of the 
Possibilities Study very few of the main areas of cooperation have been 
explored, considering that most of the areas incorporated colocation and 
alignment of planning processes, something we have yet to see in NORDEFCO 
from 2009 to 2014. It is interesting to ask why such avenues have not been 
explored, however when discussing these matters with my sources, there is a 
sense that when even the less integrated and less complicated projects such as 
the Archer program fails, a sense of hopelessness can surface, increasing the 
inertia of the entire framework.241 Moreover, it seems obvious that the old 
concern of national control still underpins Norwegian behaviour, as Kampenes 
confirms when discussing what is needed to achieve more in the realm of MDC: 
[…] Norway will also have to renounce certain things; we will have to 
forego some national sovereignty […], and for such things as the 
transport-cooperation [NORTAT, ed.] this is momentous stuff. [ed. 
transl.]242 
In this chapter we have seen how the Possibilities Study, the Stoltenberg Report 
and Gen. Diesen’s drive toward cooperation, primarily between Norway and 
Sweden, helped create NORDEFCO. The motivation for cooperation was primarily 
saving money and retaining capabilities, and the idea was that the common size, 
geography and culture would make cooperation more likely to succeed. 
However, apart from certain acquisition programs that have had a greater scope 
than before, NORDEFCO’s practices represents no real departure from previous 
practices. Despite its ambition of being ‘comprehensive’, few signs point in such 
a direction even after almost five years of running. The framework sets out to 
work as a low-threshold bottom-up style framework, but many initiatives are 
primarily top-down such as NORTAT and other procurement programs. Moreover, 
the procurement programs have been troubled by national efforts to promote its 
own industry, rather than solely focusing on the most efficient solution.  
                                         




For Norway, two limiting factors quickly present themselves: Alignment and 
level of integration. It seems to be very important for Norway to reassure NATO 
allies that NORDEFCO does not represent any sort of shift in priority or 
understanding of where the foundation of Norwegian security is based. When 
queried about NORDEFCO’s role, the Defence Ministers of the period have been 
steadfast in their emphasis on NATO’s role in Norwegian security policy. The 
level of integration seems to be limited by a fear of losing control or assured 
access. While studies show that deep integration would yield the most savings, it 
is evident that the loss of control that such integration entails is not considered 
to be worth the trade. Despite these issues, Norwegian Defence Ministers have 
called the NORDEFCO framework is a success. The basis for this success seems to 
be founded in the level of participation and not any metric of savings or 
increased capability, which was an ambition for NORDEFCO. This represents a 
disconnect that is interesting, especially when considering that participation was 
utilised as a means to an end during the 1990s, when Norway believed that 
participation in international operations would increase the likelihood of support 











3 ‘Smart Defence’ 
In this chapter I will describe NATO’s ‘Smart Defence’ initiative, its origins, inner 
workings and how Norway approaches the initiative. I will highlight some of the 
underlying factors that motivated the Secretary General to engage NATO in this 
effort, how it has been implemented, and what output NATO has seen in the 
period. I will also describe how certain issues have posed a challenge for the 
Alliance since its foundation, and how these issues underpin many of the 
decisions and initiatives the past 15-20 years. I will describe the three main 
pillars in the concept: prioritisation, specialisation and cooperation, and I will 
describe how these ideas, that were meant to permeate the ‘Smart Defence’ 
concept, have given way to an emphasis on achieving short-term goals, rather 
than the long-term change that the concept demands. To better describe this 
focus on short-term results, I will outline the experiences of the project 
manager of the only Norwegian-led project in the ‘Smart Defence’ portfolio. In 
addition to a description of the broader reactions to the initiative, I will describe 
Norway’s approach to ‘Smart Defence’ based on Norway’s behaviour, statements 
and participation in projects within the initiative.  
NATO challenges in the past 
In order to understand the origin of Smart Defence, it is useful to understand 
some of the main issues that NATO has faced since its foundation. The more 
persistent and dominant debate concerning the internal workings of NATO is that 
of burden-sharing. In essence, burden-sharing relates to the division of cost and 
commitment of forces between the member nations. Referred to as the 
‘transatlantic bargain’, the initial agreement was that the U.S. maintained a 
commitment of strategic and naval forces toward the defence of Europe, while 
European nations, on the other hand, worked to increase their contributions 
toward the same enterprise.243 Concerns that some of the European nations were 
‘free-riding’244 arose when it became known that the ratio of U.S. to European 
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relative burden rose to 75-25 respectively.245 The challenge of addressing the 
burden-sharing issue was centred around the fact that even though legitimate 
reasons existed as to why the European contribution should be increased, there 
were also legitimate reasons why the European contribution was actually at an 
appropriate level already.246 Another aspect to take note of is that burden-
sharing does not exclusively relate to monetary cost and budget allocation. 
Despite the fact that such factors are easy to measure and compare between 
nations, Cooper and Zycher argues that since different nations achieve a 
different degree of ‘defence output’ from their allocations, it is more prudent to 
compare output rather than input.247 This leads the debate to include not only 
how much money that is allocated to defence spending, but also how it is spent 
and what is produced as a result.  
This leads us to the challenge relating to the actual defence output and the 
ability of allies to partake in operations. This became a concern after the end of 
the Cold War when the alliance became involved in several operations outside 
the territory considered to be the operating area of the alliance. These so-called 
‘out-of-area’248 operations began with the different operations relating to the 
conflict in the Balkans, continuing with the Afghani and Libyan operations. These 
operations highlighted a disparity in participation, with some countries taking 
part in most or all of the operations and some countries opting out,249 and a 
disparity in ability, with some countries being wholly unable to conduct certain 
offensive operations.250 The interesting point is that the countries that choose to 
partake the most are not always the ones who spend the most on defence,251 
suggesting that there is an imbalance in will as well as an imbalance in funding.  
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Another related aspect of burden sharing is whether or not the alliance has been 
able to deploy all the equipment and manpower necessary to conduct a 
successful military campaign anywhere in the world, and operate successfully 
together in a combined operation.  
Already in 1977, concerns were raised indicating that despite ‘continuing 
enormous investment’, the Alliance was unable to properly integrate the 
systems of the different nations together in what is called ‘fusion’.252 The 
challenges to such integration were especially evident in the areas of tactical 
communications and intelligence operations.253 Operations such as heavy airlift, 
intelligence collection/dissemination and large-scale logistic operations have 
always relied heavily on U.S. participation.254 Before the end of the Cold War, 
this was less of a concern for NATO, because the whole premise of the 
organisation was that all nations would be called to arms in the event of a 
conflict, therefore it was unlikely that the European nations would need to 
duplicate these assets to make them available both with and without U.S. 
involvement.255 Using Operation Allied Force (Kosovo Air Campaign, 1999) as an 
example, the disparities become evident: The European allies were shown to 
lack the capability to conduct the operations necessary to sustaining a force 
outside their own borders.256 The European nations did not lack capabilities in 
just one area or a narrow set of areas. They lacked capabilities in every aspect 
of the operation, from strategic airlift to aerial refuelling to all-weather and 
precision fighter operations.257 These gaps had to be filled by the U.S., which 
became a concern on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to the lack of 
capabilities, the operation identified interoperability issues as well. Examples 
ranged from a lack of secure communications capabilities to compatibility of 
American aircraft to refuel using British tankers.258  
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To summarise, NATO has struggled with disparity since its foundation. There are 
three disparities that I would like to emphasise: 1) Disparity in funding, 2) 
disparity in ability, 3) disparity in will. These disparities can all be bundled into 
the burden-sharing debate, but it is useful to consider these disparities 
individually when studying the Smart Defence initiative and its origins.  
The Economy, Libya and ‘The Pivot’  
The events leading up to 2011 when ‘Smart Defence’ was launched, were 
dramatic and encompassed significant dimensions including strategic, 
operational and financial areas. To understand why Secretary General Rasmussen 
felt the need for an initiative such as ‘Smart Defence’, it is useful to understand 
the economic and security political events that immediately preceded 
Rasmussen’s push for change in the NATO community. The principle events were 
the economic developments of 2008 and onward, the Alliance’s experiences in 
the Libyan campaign of 2011, and the loom of an American ‘rebalancing’ toward 
the Asian theatre as opposed to the European. I will now highlight all three of 
these events. 
The Economy 
From 2008, continuing to beyond 2014 for some countries, Europe experienced a 
wave of budget crises-to-bailout cycles. What has been called ‘The Great 
Recession’259 has several complex root causes, with the arguably largest cause 
lying in the American housing bubble of 2006 and the Investment Banking crisis 
of late 2007 and throughout all of 2008. The largest contributing factor to this 
crisis was a dramatic drop in value of a financial construct called sub-prime 
mortgage bundling.260 This recession in turn siphoned into the so-called Eurozone 
Crisis beginning in 2010, also a debt crisis, where some of the largest countries 
in the Euro-zone, and also in NATO, found themselves unable to balance their 
budgets while continuing to service their debt. Starting with Greece in 2010, and 
continuing with Ireland, Portugal and Spain, confidence in the European 
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financial system declined, and the countries involved received massive interest 
hikes on their loans, leading to the need for bailouts to avoid insolvency.261 When 
recession hits, it is understandably hard to advocate spending money on security 
if the public does not consider their security as threatened as their jobs or their 
welfare. What followed the Great Recession were strict austerity measures, as 
Rasmussen noted in the speech that ended up launching the initiative,262 which 
affected defence budgets throughout Europe.  
The budget cuts were dramatic. Between 2009 and 2011 European defence 
budgets were reduced by $22 Billion, or 7.3%. As Terlikowski notes, the cuts in 
defence spending that followed the end of the cold war were never as dramatic 
as this, only reaching 5,6% in the 93-95 period.263 For some countries the 
reduction in spending from 2007 to 2012 is even more radical. In this period, 
Latvia reduced their spending from USD 552 million to USD 252 million,264 a 54% 
reduction.265 The trend repeated itself, albeit not so dramatically, in the other 
new NATO countries, with reductions ranging from 35% for Lithuania, 31% for the 
Czech Republic, and 26% for Slovakia.266 The larger European countries were not 
spared from the downward trend in budgets in the same time period, although 
the figures were nowhere near as dramatic. France saw a reduction of about 5%, 
while the number was close to 1% for the UK.267 Considering the increasing cost 
of military equipment and training for the same period, the reduction in military 
output would be larger than the percentages indicate. Consequentially, nations 
were forced to face large cuts in a relatively short period of time. When cuts 
reach north of the 10% mark in a matter of years, it is safe to assume that 
militaries are unable to absorb cuts through reorganisation, pay cuts or 
reduction in training alone. Removal of structural elements would be the only 
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way to absorb such a massive cut, and the choice becomes not whether to cut, 
but what to cut. When making these choices without consulting NATO or 
considering how their choice would affect the Alliance, Rasmussen meant they 
were doing ‘specialisation by default’.268 He wanted nations rather to consult 
NATO before cutting specific capabilities, and through that consultation perform 
the specialisation by ‘design’ rather than ‘default’, in order to avoid a decline in 
the overall ability of the Alliance to reach its goals.269  
The Libya Campaign 
The Libya campaign highlighted in a very clear way some of the challenges 
facing the Alliance when conducting complex and resource heavy operations 
such as Operation Unified Protector (second phase of the Libya operation) 
demonstrated. Traditionally, the United States has provided the bulk of the 
assets required to conduct a modern military operation. Once again observing 
Operation Allied Force: ‘Three-quarters of the aircraft, four-fifths of the 
ordinance, and most of the intelligence were provided by the U.S..’270 In 
Operation Unified Protector, the U.S. with its massive force of drones, 
intelligence and targeting systems, air assets, air-to-air refuelling assets, 
assumed the core coordinating function of the operation, while the other allies 
contributed with what they could manage and what they could stomach 
dependant on their ability and will. NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador, 
Claudio Bisogniero, explained this situation in no unsure terms: ‘[...] the success 
of that operation depended on unique and essential capabilities in key areas 
which only the United States could offer.’271  
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The disparity between what the U.S. and its European counterparts could 
provide was also very clearly stated by then Secretary of Defence Robert Gates’ 
last speech in office:  
[…] However, while every alliance member voted for Libya mission, 
less than half have participated at all, and fewer than a third have 
been willing to participate in the strike mission. Frankly, many of 
those allies sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want 
to participate, but simply because they can’t. The military 
capabilities simply aren’t there.272 
Coming from the U.S. Secretary of Defence, these are powerful words of 
frustration. Moreover, the similarities between the Libyan and the Kosovo 
campaigns are strikingly similar, which might add to the frustration because so 
little has apparently changed in 12 years. What must have been obvious for any 
NATO official was that for NATO to restore faith in the abilities of the European 
side of the transatlantic community, these issues would need to be addressed. 
‘The Pivot’ 
The American ‘pivot’ to Asia has been a source for concern for proponents of the 
transatlantic community since it was first dubbed in then Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton’s article ‘America’s Pacific Century’.273 In this she emphasises the 
growing importance of the Pacific region as ‘a key driver of global politics’, and 
the importance of U.S. involvement in its future.274 Although she states very 
clearly that Europe still is a high priority, the article caused concern in the 
European community. One scholar summed up the shift: ‘What the pivot means 
for Europe is most likely an eventual softening of U.S. security guarantees for 
the continent.’275 Despite such pessimism, there are those who consider the pivot 
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to be influencing the transatlantic relationship in an insignificant way. Michael 
Rühle contends that:  
The U.S. ‘Asian pivot’ will not change the fact that no continents are 
more like-minded and more geared toward cooperation, including in 
the military domain, than Europe and North America.276  
Assuming that the pivot implies that the U.S. will, to a lesser degree than 
before, prioritise the needs of its European partners; then NATO has to plan for 
the possibility of having to operate without American support, a necessity that 
fuels the ‘Smart Defence’ initiative. 
The economic development, the experiences of Libya, and the fear of American 
abandonment were powerful motivations for the Secretary General to act. 
Alarming enough one by one, these events prompted Rasmussen to act to avoid 
his fears of a security crisis being realised.277 Not all the challenges that 
Rasmussen highlighted applied to Norway as much as others. But given Norway’s 
reliance on NATO as a security guarantor, and the importance of U.S. 
involvement in NATO, an American shift of attention to Asia would definitively 
be of concern for Norway.  
The launch of the ‘Smart Defence’ initiative 
The concept of the ‘Smart Defence’ initiative itself can be argued to have 
stemmed from the declarations in the Lisbon Summit in 2010, where the NATO 
countries agreed on a new strategic concept that would form the framework for 
the alliance’s transformational work toward 2020. Officially called: ‘Active 
Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of 
the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’, or ‘NATO Forces 2020’ 
for short.278 NATO had for several years acknowledged that the organisation did 
not possess the means to achieve the requirements it set for itself, expressed in 
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both the Lisbon and Chicago declarations and in earlier reports from NATO, 
reports describing shortfalls in several areas considered critical capabilities in 
NATO.279 The Lisbon declaration contained an explicit task for the Secretary 
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and the North Atlantic Council to reform the 
organisation in order to better address these shortfalls: 
We task the Secretary General and the Council to take forward the 
reform process in all necessary areas without delay, including the 
implementation of: Reviews of the Agencies and NATO Command 
Structure; comprehensive Resource Management Reform; 
Headquarters Reform, including the new Headquarters project; and an 
end-to-end rationalisation review of all structures engaged in NATO 
capability development.280 
The Secretary General then coined the term ‘Smart Defence’ in his speech at 
the Munich Security Conference in February 2011, and hailed it as a means of 
facing some of the challenges that were identified during the Lisbon Summit. In 
his speech, the Secretary General focused on the on-going economic challenges 
in Europe, and how ‘Smart Defence’ can help ensure a more cost-effective way 
of thinking about security issues and paving the way for a more efficient 
alliance. This would in turn ‘prevent the economic crisis from becoming a 
security crisis.’281  
The Secretary General followed up the statements from Munich with an article in 
Foreign Affairs, in the midst of Operation Unified Protector in Libya, detailing 
some of the challenges facing the alliance as a result of reduced defence 
spending, and how he proposed these challenges be faced.282 Although 
Rasmussen focused on the positive aspects of the operation and NATO’s 
progress, he conceded that there existed both a ‘spending gap’ due to declining 
budgets, and a developing ‘security gap’ due to the rise of emerging powers such 
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as Brazil, India, Russia and China. As a response to these challenges, Rasmussen 
reaffirmed his position from Munich by stating that Europe should ‘pursue a 
‘Smart Defence’ approach’.283 Rasmussen contended that broad-spectrum 
capabilities were too costly for most nations, and that nations therefore should 
group together to develop capabilities from which they all could benefit,284 and 
also avoid ‘uncoordinated cuts’ from ‘jeopardizing the continent’s future 
security’.285 To solidify his commitment to this initiative, Rasmussen appointed 
two special envoys to promote ‘Smart Defence’ in the Alliance, Deputy Secretary 
General Claude Bisogniero and General Stephane Abrial, whose purpose was to 
assist the nations in implementing the policies derived from the ‘Smart Defence’ 
initiative.286   
When all 28 NATO countries met for the Chicago Summit in 2012, ‘Smart 
Defence’ was very much part of the discussion, even though most of the outside 
attention was aimed at NATO’s plans for withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. 
The Chicago Summit declared that it would commit to ‘Smart Defence’, and 
during the summit 20 multinational projects were presented as part of the 
solution to avoid capability gaps in the alliance.287 Later referred to as part of 
the ‘Chicago Defence Package’,288 the proposal swelled by October 2013 to 28 
smaller projects and four larger, strategic projects.289 The smaller projects are 
listed below: 
1. Multinational Aviation Training Centre 
2. Immersive Training Environments   
3. Individual Training and Education Programmes  
4. Multinational Military Flight Crew Training  
5. Centres of Excellence as Hubs of Education and Training  
6. Computer Information Services E-Learning Training Centres Network  
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7. Pooling & Sharing Multinational Medical Treatment Facilities  
8. Pooling of Deployable Air Activation Modules 
9. Pooling Maritime Patrol Aircraft  
10. Pooling CBRN Capabilities 
11. Multinational Cyber Defence Capability Development  
12. Multinational Logistics Partnership - Fuel Handling  
13. Multinational Logistics Partnership - Mine Resistant Ambush Vehicle maintenance  
14. Joint Logistics Support Group  
15. Multinational Cooperation on Munitions  
16. NATO Universal Armaments Interface 
17. Deployable Contract Specialist Group  
18. Multinational Joint Headquarters Ulm  
19. Female Leaders in Security and Defence  
20. Development of Personnel Reserve Capabilities 
21. Theatre Opening Capability  
22. Dismantling, Demilitarization and Disposal of Military Equipment  
23. Counter IED – Biometrics  
24. Remotely controlled robots for clearing roadside bombs  
25. Establishment of a Multinational Geospatial Support Group 
26. Harbour Protection 
27. Alliance Defence Analysis and Planning for Transformation  
28. Defensive Aids Suite 
 
The larger, strategic projects are as follows: 
1. NATO’s Missile Defence capability  
2. Alliance Ground Surveillance programme  
3. NATO Air Policing over Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia 
4. Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance   
 
The strategic projects promoted in this package were at this point already long-
running, and considered ‘flagship’ projects that could function as symbols of 
NATO’s progress toward filling its capability gaps.290 The rest of the projects are 
mostly aimed at mitigating issues and rationalising processes relating to logistics, 
munitions and armament, and the training of personnel.  
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Soon after Chicago, NATO had worked to formalize the principles of the ‘Smart 
Defence’ initiative. They identified three key components that would form what 
they called ‘the constituents’ of ‘Smart Defence’: Prioritisation, specialisation 
and cooperation,291 These ‘constituents’ were nonetheless absent from the 
discussion in Chicago, and in the Press Release after the summit, emphasis was 
given to the possibility of an increase in capabilities, rather than on how to 
avoid the uncoordinated cuts mentioned in Rasmussen’s Foreign Affairs 
commentary.292 On the other hand, one NATO official was quoted in a Centre for 
European Reform Policy Brief as saying: ‘There are very few joint purchases of 
new equipment among the proposals; most are about maintaining and 
rationalising existing assets’.293 The constituents that NATO considers the 
framework for ‘Smart Defence’ seeks each to face challenges long observed in 
NATO, exemplified by the reports leading up to the Lisbon Summit.294 I will now 
expand on these three constituents.  
The concept: Prioritisation, specialisation and cooperation 
In the context of ‘Smart Defence’, prioritisation requires nations to:  
[A]lign their capability development primarily with the NATO Strategic 
Concept of 2010 and the capability requirements for NATO Forces 
2020 that are derived from them.295  
Nations will need to both prepare for the future needs of the alliance, and 
remove assets that are no longer needed in the NATO framework,296 and also 
accept and adopt NATO’s concept and requirements as their own. Rasmussen 
said very clearly in his Foreign Affairs article what he expected each nation to 
do:  
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Keeping a deployable army, a powerful navy, and a strong air force 
costs money, however, and not all European countries can afford to 
have a bit of everything. So they should set their priorities on the 
basis of threats, cost-effectiveness, and performance -- not budgetary 
considerations or prestige alone.297 
The challenge remains of how to convince nations to commit to such an 
alignment into the NATO framework, if the nations themselves do not see the 
need for it. The paradox may remain that, as Henius and McDonald so bluntly 
puts it: ‘Many governments would rather have autonomous and useless militaries 
than integrated and capable ones.’298 This perpetuates the disparity in ability. 
Specialisation, on the other hand, requires nations to focus on niche capabilities, 
and then receive capabilities from other nations when required.299 An example 
could be that a nation with a well-proven Special Operations capability abandons 
assets that are not as needed in the Alliance, and utilising the surplus funds to 
hone and enhance the well-proven Special Operations capability. NATO implies 
that such a specialisation already occurs by default, because budget pressures 
require them to abandon certain costly capabilities. What NATO wants to see is 
specialisation ‘by design’,300 but they do not explain who will be the designer and 
what entity will govern the design process, only noting that NATO expects the 
process to be done with NATO functioning as an advisor and facilitator.301 This 
uncertainty may explain why specialisation has been so absent from the 
discussion. 
The principle of cooperation, however, is more intuitively understood and more 
naturally implemented in the NATO daily life. Cooperation in training, exercises 
and operations has been the cornerstone of NATO’s work since its inception. 
Even after the end of the Cold War, the discussion of multinational cooperation 
has surfaced time and again. Lt.Col. Gerhard Stelz wrote the following in 1996 
which exemplifies the issue: 
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The integration of national contingents into multinational structures 
has advantages and disadvantages, advocates and opponents. Both 
sides are able to give sound reasons to substantiate their arguments. 
Considering the matter from merely one point of view would not do 
justice to the subject.302 
The situation today is not one of whether or not NATO should operate in 
multinational structures or not, but how to do it most efficiently. However, in 
the ‘Smart Defence’ debate there is obviously a great deal of emphasis on 
cooperation in procurement, maintenance and training facilities in order to cut 
expenses and gain capabilities. The question remains whether or not nations 
intentionally ignore the other aspects of the initiatives, which I will expand on 
later. 
Adhering to the three constituents is obviously challenging. Arguably the hardest 
to address is how to convince the member states to begin to prioritise and 
specialise their defence spending and planning in such a way that they focus on 
areas that are lacking, not in a nation-centric perspective but in a NATO-wide 
perspective. Naturally, this is a contentious issue due to the fact that in order to 
comply with these constituents, nations will have to shift their focus from 
preparing to defend themselves while being able to assist in helping other allies, 
to considering how they best can contribute to the defence of the alliance as a 
whole. This will require them to accept the fact that the only entity able to 
defend them from the multiple threats a nation-state faces, is the alliance.303 
From this, one would expect countries that have ‘surplus’ capabilities that 
previously have formed the backbone of any armed forces, such as tank and 
infantry, will have to be removed in a given nation due to the fact that NATO 
does not need it in that specific nation. Conversely, nations that are in a 
strategically significant position requiring a certain capability will have to 
acquire or expand that capability in order to satisfy the needs of the alliance. A 
dramatic example would be nation foregoing an entire service branch, because 
it is not strictly needed. Once such a decision is made and effectuated, it takes 
an enormous amount of time, money and training to rebuild.  
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NATO has expressed that ‘Smart Defence’ will ensure that NATO avoids 
capability gaps, unnecessary acquisition, and would achieve economy of scale.304  
Inner workings 
As already mentioned, when ‘Smart Defence’ became a matter-of-fact NATO 
initiative, two special envoys, the Deputy Secretary General and the Supreme 
Allied Commander Transformation, were tasked to promote the initiative 
throughout the alliance. Allied Command Transformation (ACT) was tasked with 
running the daily work on the initiative, and ACT created a ‘core team’ to 
manage ‘Smart Defence’, led by the special envoys.305 ACT wanted to identify as 
many MDC initiatives as possible to contribute in achieving the goals in ‘Smart 
Defence’.306 Suggestions came in from all directions, and it was soon decided 
that there was to be a list of ‘Smart Defence’ projects. Every single suggestion 
ended up in this list, and the number of projects became a metric of success, 
along with other quantifiable indicators of progress such as how many workshops 
had been conducted. Focus on the size of the list became so prevalent that old 
projects that, as Lt. Col. Seierstad noted, ‘began long before anyone had ever 
mentioned the words ‘Smart Defence’ were reborn as ‘Smart Defence’ projects.’ 
[ed. transl.]307 It was a process of picking ‘low-hanging fruits’ in order to deliver 
something substantial. One curious, and symptomatic observation came when 
Seierstad saw that Norway had been added to a list of participants in a project 
without any representative from Norway ever expressing an interest in it, ‘just 
because some staff officer assumed that Norway might be interested.’ [ed. 
transl.]308 When the projects were collected, they were categorised into three 
tiers based on how close they were to execution. Tier-1 projects were projects 
that were close to execution, or already underway. That included having 
identified a willing ‘lead nation’, having participants ready, having agreements 
such as Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Understanding signed, and so on. 
Tier-2 were projects that were relatively mature, but lacked a significant 
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element before being ready for execution, such as an identified ‘lead nation’. 
Tier-3 were all the other suggestions. The projects were categorised according 
to seven capability areas: Prepare, Protect, Project, Sustain, C3,309 Engage, 
Inform. In mid-2014 there were well over 100 ‘Smart Defence’ projects being 
considered.310  
As part the effort of having quantifiable progress on the ‘Smart Defence’ project 
list, ACT had goals of 40 ‘Tier-1’ projects by a given date, without any emphasis 
on what type of project they were, or whether they contributed in any way 
toward the overarching goal of ‘Smart Defence’.311 When the project list was 
established, it was then up to either ACT or any given so-called ‘sponsor 
committee’312 to promote progress in the project. For the people managing these 
projects, the process could be at times long and thorny, as a researcher at the 
Norwegian Defence Research Institute, Sigurd Glærum, experienced when he 
assumed the chair of the only ‘Smart Defence’-project led by Norway: ADAPT.313  
ADAPT 
ADAPT stands for ‘Alliance Defence Analysis and Planning for Transformation’, a 
project to utilise a computer program created by NATO in 2003 as a tool to assist 
in long-term planning, ADAPT was started as a bilateral cooperation project 
between NATO Communication and Information Agency (NCIA) long before 
‘Smart Defence’ started, but was quickly suggested as a ‘Smart Defence’ project 
following 2011-12. Glærum, who became head of the project, is very clear that 
becoming a ‘Smart Defence’ project wasn’t important to him, but since being a 
‘Smart Defence’ project would make the project multilateral instead of 
bilateral, the overhead cost that were necessary to maintain bilateral 
agreements could be reduced by bringing in more nations.314 The decision was 
made quickly, but the decision did bring with it some problems:  
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Becoming a ‘Smart Defence’ project was, well [Smart Defence] had a 
lot of attention, so why not call it a ‘Smart Defence’ project? […] 
Since then it has been a long and thorny road.315  
According to Glærum it was important that Norway became lead nation for a 
‘Smart Defence’ project, and was able to ‘tick that box’.316 The initial plan was 
to get nations interested, sign a statement of interest, and proceed to sign an 
MoU in order to finalise what the project would look like and encompass. The 
process of signing an MoU was according to Glærum not easy:  
It has been a painful process. It is a legal document where nations 
commit to things, and committing to things is scary. It is not the first 
time someone creates an MoU in a ‘Smart Defence’ context, there 
existed some that we thought we could use as a template. But it is 
very dependant upon what people attend the meetings. Especially 
lawyers, they have opinions about things, while the lawyers that made 
these other MoU’s they had other opinions about things, so certain 
nations have been difficult here. […] Even if the commitments of the 
MoU only amounts to €10.000 per year, an extremely low risk, they 
still bring all these formalities. [ed. transl.]317 
When I spoke to Glærum he had worked to finalise the deal for three years, and 
it was still not complete and signed. His goal was to complete the process in the 
fall of 2014, and declare a formal start to the project from the start of 2015.318 
The process was completed on 24 February 2015, with only Norway, Finland and 
Germany as participants.319 For a project that actually increased the amount of 
money spent by Norway on this tool, and may not be used by more than three 
nations in the Alliance, it would definitely present an interesting cost-benefit 
case analysis. What it does do is provide some insight into the challenges of 
every day life of officials working in a NATO setting, and why many of them 
become frustrated with lack of progress. 
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The list and the vision 
Eventually, the project list became synonymous with ‘Smart Defence’. As one 
NATO official was cited saying: ‘NATO’s Smart Defense initiative boils down to a 
series of short-term pragmatic projects and a long-term vision for building 
capabilities.’320 The list was the here and now, and the vision was long-term. The 
question remains: what is happening with the vision? It seems as the problem of 
implementing change quickly hits the wall of sovereign freedom of action. David 
Hobbs, the Secretary General of NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly touches on this 
and the issue of defence industry, in a video interview published by NATO:  
If it had been easy, it would have already been done. And there are 
some thorny issues. For example, it’s all very well to say that we will 
all be better off if we could have a better division of labour in our 
defence procurement. But if you’ve got a munitions factory in your 
constituency then actually you would like to keep that open. What 
we’re talking about with ‘Smart Defence’, are pooling capabilities, 
pooling resources, and that’s going to require, if you like, a new level 
of trust. The buzz phrase is ‘guaranteed access’. If I own a certain 
capability, and I want to do something with it, nationally, I don’t have 
a problem. If, however, I’ve only got that capability because I’ve 
developed that jointly with an ally or collection of allies, then there 
has to be some rules of the road about how I can, how we all can 
make use of that capability when we need it.321  
Mr Hobbs’ remarks echo the concerns of Norwegian officials as we will see later 
on, but also other, larger, nations of the Alliance such as Germany. In her paper 
‘Bundeswehr 3.0: The political, military and social dimensions of the reform of 
the German Armed Forces’, Justyna Gotkowska claims that: 
Germany will not be ready to become involved in cooperation which 
could result in a permanent interdependence between partners with 
regard to capabilities used in international operations. This applies 
above all to units of the army, air force and the navy conducting 
combat operations. Germany is concerned that interdependence in 
such capabilities shared with its main partners (France and the UK) 
may lead to political pressure for Germany to engage in operations 
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supported by these countries but not necessarily convergent with 
German interests.322 
Gotkowska also says that for precisely the same reason, France and the UK will 
not cooperate with Germany, painting a picture of deep-seated mistrust.323 
Although the vision of ‘Smart Defence’ is admirable, it seems obvious that the 
most far-reaching goals are hard to achieve, due to the hurdles described in 
Hobbs’ statement. These considerations are very understandable, as access to 
military capabilities, and concerns of having a nation’s hand forced are serious 
issues. 
Reactions to the ‘Smart Defence’ initiative 
Rasmussen’s remarks regarding ‘Smart Defence’ can be considered broad, not 
very specific, and not very new. As we have seen, the alliance struggled to 
mitigate issues relating to interoperability and cooperation already in the late 
1970s. The concept of working to increase the sharing of resources and 
increasing interoperability, cooperation was already a NATO priority in the early 
part of the 1980s, as the burden-sharing debate highlighted that it was a priority 
for the Alliance to ‘develop areas of practical co-operation’, in addition to 
evening out the gap in defence spending across the Atlantic.324  
Throughout the 1990s ideas of ‘pooling and sharing’ and closing capability gaps 
were prevalent both in NATO and EU circles, as European defence budgets 
continued to decline and the campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo highlighted 
significant shortfalls in the European community’s capabilities.325 
Notwithstanding, the initiative can be seen as paving new ground in that NATO 
was, at least initially, throwing its weight behind it. The problem is the lack of a 
clear way forward, any form of road map or framework, and this fact has caused 
NATO to receive stark criticism. The criticism has mostly been focused on two 
things: money and sovereignty. Even before Chicago, critics questioned the 
                                         
322 Justyna Gotkowska, ‘Bundeswehr 3.0: The political, military and social dimensions of the reform 
of the German Armed Forces’, Point of View, 28 (2012), p. 32 
323 Ibid., p. 33 
324 Alan Tonelson, ‘NATO Burden-Sharing: Promises, Promises’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 23 
(2000), p. 42 
325 Ibid., p.50. 
87 
 
economic arguments of the initiative. Antonin Novotny put it bluntly by saying 
that ‘the ‘Smart Defence’ initiative risks allowing European countries to believe 
that they can do more with less, when in actuality they will be doing less with 
less.’326 Marcin Terlikowski reaffirms this position by noting that:  
‘Smart Defence’ is too focused on savings, and many Allies openly 
admit that a financial motive drove the project selection process. The 
impression arose that what really mattered to governments was either 
the hope that someone else would pay—at least partly—to sustain the 
most expensive capabilities (or to gain access to new assets) or a 
willingness to use participation in ‘Smart Defence’ to improve leaders’ 
political images, badly struck by deep cuts.327  
Other scholars have reacted with scepticism regarding the challenges to national 
autonomy and sovereignty in the initiative. This relates most of all to the 
specialisation principle. In a ‘food for thought’ paper, the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies said the following regarding specialisation: 
Politically, nations would worry that they might be asked to provide 
capabilities to a mission in which they did not want to take part, or 
that countries on which they depended for a certain capability would 
not make it available.328 
In a sense, the situation that is described in this paper already existed in 2012. 
With the shifting and uncertain future of American priorities, the European 
countries already find themselves in a situation where they cannot be certain 
that the U.S. will support them with the critical capabilities that Europe does 
not possess. Thusly, one can argue that nations, in actual fact, are left with no 
other choice: They will have to swallow the disadvantages of compliance with 
the initiative in order to avoid the negative consequences of doing nothing.329 
Although there is broad agreement that action is needed, Andrew Michta argues 
that NATO has to stop focusing on buzzwords such as ‘Smart Defence’, and 
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commit to real action that produces results. In his mind initiatives such as 
‘Smart Defence’ are useless: 
We have come to the point that NATO has been reduced to something 
like the Transatlantic family’s used, somewhat beat-up second car. 
Everyone admits that we still need it, but no one wants to be the 
family member stuck driving it. […] There is no great mystery about 
what needs to happen to keep NATO from becoming finally a victim of 
its own Cold War success. It needs to inject some strategic and fiscal 
reality into the conversation and consign buzz words like ‘smart 
defense’ to the hell of academic conferences. NATO members need to 
multiply real resources, not conceptual abstractions. Above all, the 
alliance needs to define a task that it can succeed at in the near 
term.330 
Michta’s comments may be the ones closest to what Norwegian policy-makers 
themselves think about ‘Smart Defence’ and the developments in the 
transatlantic community. As we will see, it seems like Norway doesn’t want to 
drive beat-up second car either. 
Norway’s approach to ‘Smart Defence’ 
The Norwegian reaction to ‘Smart Defence’ after Rasmussen introduced the 
initiative has been less vocal compared to that of NORDEFCO. Nordic 
cooperation was discussed in the three major studies of 2007-8, the Possibilities 
Study, the Defence Study 2007 and the Defence White Paper 2007, but ‘Smart 
Defence’ has not been discussed in any equivalent study. At most, the initiative 
has been referenced in the information sections of the 2013 and 2014 versions of 
the proposition to the defence budget from the Defence Ministry. Here one could 
read that the initiative would ‘address, among other things, NATO’s long-term 
capability needs’ [ed. transl.]331 The Ministry went on to affirm that:  
Norway will, in the follow-up of the defence package, actively support 
work on ‘Smart Defence’. The government will increase its emphasis 
on training and exercises, and contribute to a more appropriate 
defence planning process in NATO to ensure that the alliance 
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continues to develop a balanced structure that is aligned with the 
level of ambition. [ed. transl.]332 
Apart from the sparse mention in official documents, the initiative has been 
referenced by officials in several speeches since the Munich conference in 2011. 
In April 2012, one month before the Chicago Summit, State Secretary Roger 
Ingebrigtsen outlined the Norwegian perspective on ‘Smart Defence’, as it was 
understood at the time. Mr Ingebrigtsen indicated that the core components of 
the initiative were nothing new, the difference was ‘the pressing requirement 
for results’.333 Interestingly, Mr Ingebrigtsen said the following about national 
control over capability development: 
‘Smart Defence’ requires a change in the national and NATO cultures 
of cooperation. The easy option is to hold on to what we have – 
national control over all aspects of capability development, national 
industry, national facilities. In order to gain the capabilities we need 
for the future, some of this may have to be sacrificed.334 
This is a surprising acknowledgement that Norway would have to forego some 
degree of control over capability development, something the country has not 
been willing to do in the past. However, as is often the case with politicians, Mr 
Ingebrigtsen immediately presented a caveat in his understanding of ‘Smart 
Defence’: 
’Smart Defence’ is therefore about striking a balance between 
legitimate and important national concerns – and the benefits we 
could obtain from a new culture of cooperation in the alliance and 
with important partners.335 
Mr Ingebrigtsen went on to discuss how Norway felt the constituents of ‘Smart 
Defence’ should be approached in practice, before delving into what he noted as 
the obstacles and limitations to ‘Smart Defence’. In this part of his speech, Mr 
Ingebrigtsen made quite a few surprising admissions: 
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In our case, as for most Allies, we have certain national tasks and 
responsibilities that must be handled on a national basis. Therefore, 
shared units in the force structure are currently not on our agenda. 
The same goes for specialization in critical capabilities. We have 
decided to maintain a full spectrum of basic military capabilities in 
order to remain capable to deal with vital national requirements. This 
should however not be in the way of significant multinational 
cooperation in capability development.336 
What Mr Ingebrigtsen is saying is that the only aim that Norway expects to 
achieve through MDC is to save money through coordinated procurement, 
effectively ignoring a very large portion of the recommendations in the 
Possibilities Study and Defence Study 2007 that relate to colocation and shared 
assets. The Defence Minister at the time, Anne-Grethe Strøm-Erichsen also 
provided some insight into Norwegian thinking at a military seminar in December 
2012: 
Allies, in dire economic straits, feel compelled to cut quickly and in 
many cases, unilaterally. We also see that common funded or 
multilateral projects come under pressure. The total defence 
expenditure in NATO is certain to drop further in the short term. 
Obviously, we cannot simply continue business as usual. The Chicago 
Summit earlier this year launched ‘Smart Defence’ and the Connected 
Forces initiative as a response to reduced budgets and reduced 
operational cooperation in Afghanistan. In such times of austerity, 
multinational solutions are the apparent answer, both in relation to 
capabilities and training.337 
Ms Strøm-Erichsen and Mr Ingebrigtsen both point out that NATO was at a turning 
point requiring new thinking, and a departure from business as usual. Both point 
to multinational solutions, but there is a certain contrast in that Mr Ingebrigtsen 
excludes multinational capability development, and Ms Strøm-Erichsen highlights 
it as a response to reduced budgets. This contrast indicates that in 2012, Norway 
had not entirely made up its mind regarding the initiative, and what it would 
mean for Norway and the Alliance.  
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In order to make good on the promise of actively supporting ‘Smart Defence’, 
the Ministry appointed a coordinator for the ‘Smart Defence’ initiative to 
coordinate ‘Smart Defence’ projects and possible Norwegian participation, 
Lt.Col. Seierstad was the first such coordinator, succeeded by Olav Magne Joli in 
mid-2014.338 Seierstad was responsible for coordinating meetings with the 
Defence Staff, and participated in NATO planning meetings on Norway’s behalf. 
The project coordinator became very influential in the process of choosing which 
projects Norway supported or actively participated in, as the decision to 
indicate interest or not in many cases depended on the active facilitation of the 
coordinator. Decisions to participate or not were however ultimately in the 
hands of the responsible staffs, Conference of National Armaments Directors 
representatives and so on.339 A ‘Smart Defence’ coordination group was 
established in the Ministry of Defence and Defence staff. Initially, the group met 
on a monthly basis. However, as the ‘Smart Defence’ project list became more 
static, the group met less frequently. For the people actually working on ‘Smart 
Defence’, enthusiasm was hard to come by. Lt.Col. Seierstad compares it to 
‘trying to whip a dead horse’.340 The problem was the list, and the incessant 
focus on delivering projects to the list. 
Seierstad provides an interesting perspective on the contrast between the 
Norwegian perspective vs. the NATO one. In Seierstad’s mind, successful 
undertakings such as the F-35 Lightning II fighter jet procurement project have 
an unparalleled degree of MDC at the core of its concept, from acquisition to 
logistics and maintenance. As such it is fulfilling all the ideas and visions for 
‘Smart Defence’, at a level which makes a real difference for NATO capability 
development. However, the F-35 procurement is ‘absolutely not a ‘Smart 
Defence’ project, and neither should it become one.’ [ed. transl.]341 For Norway, 
the focus is rather on Smart Defence at a conceptual level, leading to more 
efficient multinational capability development to meet NATO’s shortfalls in the 
prioritised capability areas. As Seierstad says: ‘That will decide whether ‘Smart 
                                         






Defence’ is a success’ [ed. transl.]342 The main purpose of ‘Smart Defence’, as 
interpreted by Norway, was to produce and preserve capabilities that are useful 
for NATO in a more cost-effective way.343 According to Seierstad, the work that 
has gone on in NATO since the start of the initiative had departed from that 
purpose, because of what he referred to as an ‘excessive focus on the list of 
‘Smart Defence’ projects, which in a way has been a dead-end.’344 This is 
because of the nature of the projects which he felt didn’t contribute to 
achieving the concept of ‘Smart Defence’, pointing out that: 
Even if all the Tier-1 [highest priority. ed.] ‘Smart Defence’ projects 
were to be successful, they wouldn’t make much of a difference for 
NATO, because they are on such a detailed level that they wouldn’t 
matter much in the grand scheme of things anyway. [ed. transl.]’345 
When you accept the premise than ‘Smart Defence’ has decomposed into a list 
of projects and not a concept for how to work within the Alliance, it is 
understandable that nations, including Norway, become pragmatic in what 
projects they choose to participate in. As Lt.Col. Seierstad explains, Norway 
participates in projects that either have been identified as having a potential to 
contribute to Norway reaching her capability goals, or where it would be likely 
that  Norway could make a unique contribution to Alliance capabilities, such as 
in the ADAPT project.346 The project list became too short-sighted, and Norway 
wanted to see more long-term change that would result in more defence for less 
money in 15 years rather than aim for minor changes happening next year.347 
Already at the beginning of the ‘Smart Defence’ project Norwegian officials 
stated that existing efforts that the Norwegian military was involved in, were in 
effect ‘Smart Defence’. Especially NORDEFCO became a way for Norway to 
highlight existing efforts in the MDC space, saying that ‘NORDEFCO stands out as 
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a good example of “Smart Defence”’.348 Espen Barth-Eide went even further 
when he claimed that the foundation of NATO, the AWACS system and the F-16 
collaboration project, European Participating Air Forces, were ‘Smart Defence’, 
stating that certain allies have a ‘somewhat simplistic approach to “Smart 
Defence”’,349 further indicating that Norway wanted to see more output from the 
initiative than what had been seen so far. He also reiterated the by now familiar 
point of retention of national sovereign control, by noting that Norway needed 
to be sure that she possessed all necessary elements of ‘the military toolbox’ at 
all times.350 It is clear that a certain scepticism was tied to ‘Smart Defence’ in 
the Ministry, and a fear that excessive cooperation might compromise national 
freedom of action. Another fear that became evident was that ‘Smart Defence’ 
would become an excuse for allies to reduce spending further than what was 
warranted, reflecting the age-old burden-sharing debate.351  
The idea that NORDEFCO was ‘Smart Defence’ has been adopted by NORDEFCO 
itself, when in their annual report for 2012 described NORDEFCO’s 
‘unbureaucratic’ cooperation was to a large extent ‘Smart Defence’, and 
dubbing it ‘Smart Defence – Nordic style’.352 This impression has been further 
emphasised by Ann-Sofie Dahl in her paper: ‘NORDEFCO and NATO: “Smart 
Defence” in the north?’, pointing out that ‘as far as “Smart Defence” goes, 
NORDEFCO could be considered something of a success’.353 Given that NORDEFCO 
is ‘Smart Defence’ in a less bureaucratic package, it is not hard to understand 
why Norway seems to prefer working in the NORDEFCO framework, and why 
Norway is highlighting work in NORDEFCO as part of its work to promote ‘Smart 
Defence’. If NORDEFCO is ‘Smart Defence’, Norway can avoid having a two-
pronged approach in multinational cooperation, while working in a framework 
that provides a great deal more relative influence. This is due to the many 
advantages of cooperating with Nordic countries, that I have already described: 
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Cultural similarities, geographic closeness, language similarities and more. With 
this approach, Norway can legitimately say that she is supporting and 
participating in promoting ‘Smart Defence’, while defining her own avenues of 
achieving her capability goals of possessing the full spectrum of military 
capabilities without any restrictions in sovereign freedom of action. This way, 
Norway doesn’t have to drive the family’s beat-up second car, but hitch a ride 
with the likeminded neighbour instead. 
In this chapter we have seen how the global economic decline of ‘The Great 
Recession’, mounting tensions regarding burden sharing, and a potential 
American shift away from Europe, motivated Secretary General Rasmussen to 
launch the NATO ‘Smart Defence’ initiative. The recession caused military 
spending in Europe to plummet, and the Secretary General wanted to mediate 
the consequences of such a decline by attempting to implement coordinated 
design into the process, as well as making an effort to change the methods and 
mentality of the organisation so as to be more integrated, coordinated and 
oriented toward the common goals of the Alliance. As we have seen, 
Rasmussen’s efforts have not yet produced the desired effect, as the drive to 
produce tangible results led to an overemphasis on a list of multinational 
projects. Reactions to the initiative have been widely negative, saying that the 
initiative is too focused on savings, rather than actually producing relevant 
capabilities. Such negativity can also be heard from the project manager of 
ADAPT, Smart Defence’s only Norwegian-led project. For Norway, an initial 
pledge to actively support represents the bulk of attention directed at the 
initiative from Norwegian policy makers, in stark contrast to the attention given 
to NORDEFCO. This can indicate two things: Firstly, Norway could feel obliged to 
support a large NATO initiative such as ‘Smart Defence’ in order to be seen as a 
loyal ally. Considering her long tradition of emphasising participation as a means 
to an end, this is a logical assumption. Secondly, Norway could have little faith 
in the initiative itself, thus limiting her participation to the bare minimum 
required to be noticed. With this in mind, it is easier to understand why 
politicians have even gone so far as to reference projects in NORDEFCO as part 
of Norway’s contribution to ‘Smart Defence’. This is interesting also because of 
the role participation has previously played in Norwegian policy, as mentioned in 
previous chapters. The question is: why isn’t ‘Smart Defence’ smart? As we have 
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seen, my sources lament NATO’s emphasis on the project list and the 
bureaucratic methods prevalent in NATO as an organisation. This is may be the 
reason why Norway has chosen to focus more on NORDEFCO; Norway may see 
more potential to achieve the desired effect in the Nordic space than in the 
NATO space.  
Summary of the Norwegian approach to MDC 
As we have seen in this and the previous chapter, there are certain 
characteristics that can be argued to be the ‘Norwegian approach’ to MDC after 
2005. These are characteristics that have been consistent regardless of which 
initiative I have observed, be it ‘Smart Defence’ or NORDEFCO. Norway’s 
tendency for pragmatism has been reiterated by many of my sources. Although 
not simply adopting a ‘what’s in it for me’-approach, Norway avoids engagement 
in projects that 1) cannot provide any gains toward capability goals, or 2) 
doesn’t provide some benefit for the NATO community. Although a certain 
degree of scepticism can be traced in Norway’s behaviour in both the Nordic and 
the NATO areas of cooperation, the country is sticking to the frameworks, 
attempting to develop them further, indicating a long-term perspective focused 
on participation as a means in and of itself.  
Furthermore, Norway seems determined to retain freedom of action, despite 
evidence that small sacrifices in this aspect could reap great rewards. Put 
another way, Norway prefers to reap rewards in areas where it can avoid tying 
knots of commitment, preferring à la carte MDC over the chef’s five course MDC 
meal. As we have seen, this behaviour has caused reactions, such as Widman’s 
claim that Norway doesn’t really want deep cooperation with Sweden.354 The 
situation, and Norway’s behaviour, echoes Olav Riste’s point of Norway’s 
tendency for ambivalence in her posture, as well as her desire for setting 
requirements for others without accepting any herself.355 It seems as though the 
long lines of Norwegian policy are firm in this respect also. Whether or not this 
firmness is evidence of any sort of grand strategy is unclear, and not something 
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4 Norway going forward 
Toward the end of 2014, when Norway and the rest of the world had been 
witness to the first conflict between two sovereign European countries since 
WWII, as Russia annexed the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea and pursued further 
land-grabs in the eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk,356 the 
general mood and rhetoric in Norway changed significantly. Although a 
declaration of war has yet to be announced there are few who now doubt that 
Russia is actively involved in the fighting using a tactic dubbed ‘Hybrid Warfare’ 
in the west, a term which is not necessary new.357 The conflict served as a wake 
up call as the ‘Crisis in Ukraine’ brought the idea of European inter-state conflict 
back into people’s minds, and the idea of Russia as a major threat to Norwegian 
security back on the table.  
For NATO, the crisis in Ukraine became a dominant topic, during which the 
heads of state of alliance met in Wales in September 2014, calling the moment 
in time ‘pivotal’ following Russia’s actions:  
[We] have gathered in Wales at a pivotal moment in Euro-Atlantic 
security. Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine have 
fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at 
peace.358 
Although the ‘Smart Defence’ initiative was mentioned in the declaration, it was 
only mentioned in relation to successful multinational projects, not as any sort 
of fundamental strategy for future development of NATO’s capabilities. 
Arguably, that role had been assumed by two other commitments. Firstly, the 
German-made Framework Nations Concept, which received a NATO-wide 
endorsement at the Wales Summit, would focus on:  
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[G]roups of Allies coming together to work multinationally for the 
joint development of forces and capabilities required by the Alliance, 
facilitated by a framework nation.359 
A further development and evolution of the ‘Smart Defence’ initiative, the 
Framework Nations Concept (FNC) was meant to produce ‘coherent sets of 
forces and capabilities, particularly in Europe.’360 FNC would create so-called 
‘clusters of cooperation’ around the major powers in Europe, primarily Germany 
and the UK, much like NORDEFCO had been in the Nordics. Although not aiming 
as high as ‘Smart Defence’ did in lifting perspectives from the nation to the 
entire alliance, FNC aimed at creating regional sets of countries that were 
aligning their capabilities in a coherent manner. Secondly and more importantly, 
the alliance agreed to:  
[R]everse the trend of declining defence budgets, to make the most 
effective use of our funds and to further a more balanced sharing of 
costs and responsibilities.361 
In essence, the nations would have to increase spending right away, and ‘move 
toward the 2% guideline within a decade’.362 Compared to the Chicago summit’s 
‘do more with less’ mentality, NATO now focused on ramping up expenditure. 
Although all 28 nations committed to the declaration, the following year, only 
six of the major NATO nations, among them Norway, had increased their 
budgets, while Germany and the UK reduced their budgets, and France had a 
flat development.363 The most tangible response to the Crisis in Ukraine came in 
early 2015, when NATO pledged to create a new reaction force to counter 
Russian aggression. Hailed by the new Secretary General of NATO Jens 
Stoltenberg as ‘the biggest reinforcement of collective defence since the end of 
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the Cold War’,364 the effort was an attempt to reassure former Soviet countries 
that are now a part of NATO that their security was in fact guaranteed by NATO. 
The quick-reaction force would be able to be mobilised in only 48 hours.365 The 
effort of reassurance was also the basis of the establishment of command and 
control elements in the former Soviet states Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, along 
with Poland, Romania and Bulgaria.366  
The Wales Summit and NATO’s actions in early 2015 solidified two things that we 
have seen are of importance to Norway: Russia is the major threat, and 
increased spending is necessary to gain capabilities. For a country that shares a 
border with Russia, and has a history of both tension and cooperation with the 
aspiring superpower, such a focus will bring more attention to Norway and 
Norwegian relations with Russia and is an obvious advantage. Because Sweden 
and Finland are in such close proximity to Russia, the events in Ukraine were 
also cause for concern for not only NATO but them as well. This led to the 
Crimean Crisis and Russian aggression funnelling into discussions in the 
NORDEFCO-framework. In the foreword of the 2014 NORDEFCO Annual Report, 
Ine Eriksen Søreide said the following: 
Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and its intervention in Eastern 
Ukraine has changed the European security landscape, with 
implications also in our own region and we have discussed how we can 
adopt our defence policies to this new situation. The Nordic nations 
have had to reconsider their security policies and their relationship 
with Russia.367 
The report also highlighted that Russia’s actions meant that the scope and 
intensity of Nordic dialogue was increased, and that it created a need for further 
exchange of information regarding emergency planning and preparedness.368 For 
the Swedish Prime Minister Hultqvist, the situation meant that a neighbour that 
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has previously been known to violate Swedish territorial integrity369 and has done 
so recently,370 was now also a ‘more provocative, unpredictable and destabilising 
Russia that has lowered the threshold to use military force’.371 A Norwegian 
representative to the Nordic Council went even further, claiming that ‘trust in 
Russia is broken’.372  
The response to Russia’s actions were, although limited, strong in Norwegian 
standards. On the one hand, Norway supported Ukraine financially through a 
humanitarian aid-package of NOK 100 million, signed by Prime Minister Solberg 
in Kiev in the fall of 2014.373 In conjunction with the financial support, Prime 
Minister Solberg denounced Russia’s actions, saying: 
Norway has expressed firm support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, 
condemning Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of 
Eastern Ukraine [ed. transl.].374 
On the other hand, Norway expressed a need to improve in three critical areas in 
order to counter a threat similar to what was seen in Crimea, these were: higher 
readiness and responsiveness, adequate situational awareness, and a 
reassessment of contingency planning for the defence of Norway.375 According to 
the Defence Minister, these challenges ultimately meant that:  
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[T]he need for multinational cooperation is greater than ever. This 
goes for all aspects of warfare; from procurement, via maintenance, 
training, and exercises, to operations.376 
Interestingly, on top of the turmoil following Russia’s actions in Ukraine, reports 
surfaced indicating that the Norwegian approach to MDC yielded very little 
actual output, calling into question the administration’s entire approach to MDC. 
In December 2014, the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (NDRE) 
released a ‘Fact Sheet’ about MDC, that suggested steps Norway should take to 
reap greater benefits from MDC.377 The report referenced another NDRE 
publication that claimed that MDC had produced only NOK 35 million in savings 
related to internal streamlining/increased efficiency.378 The Fact Sheet premised 
that MDC had failed to produce significant savings for the Norwegian military, 
and suggested that Norway emphasise areas for cooperation that have a larger 
potential for savings than what they had done in the past. As the author 
explains: 
Benefits from economies of scale are largest in cases where the 
countries own production apparatus are small. This is often the case 
for the Norwegian Armed Forces, who in several areas have a small 
number of units. Moreover, the economies of scale will be large where 
the portion of fixed costs are significant. In effect this will apply to 
areas where a significant start-up cost is associated. In other words, it 
gives little meaning to cooperate on boot camps, which require minor 
start-up costs. Cooperating on, for example, specialised maintenance 
services, training demanding a great deal of competency, or even 
cooperation on operational capabilities, will have significantly greater 
economies of scale.379  
This essentially meant that the Ministry’s claim to success due to the large 
number of active initiatives was inherently counterintuitive. Smaller, deeper and 
more comprehensive cooperation initiatives where the entire ‘production chain’ 
was identified as the most beneficial, indicating that typical NORDEFCO projects 
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such as ‘investigating joint acquisition of CV-90 rubber tracks’, or establishing a 
forum for distributive learning were essentially meaningless, punching a hole in 
the Ministry’s argument of quantity as an adequate measure of success.380 
Furthermore, projects should be carried out with a small number of participants, 
due to the associated cost of an excessive number of participants,381 indicating 
that ACT’s efforts to bring as many nations into as many ‘Smart Defence’ 
projects as possible were also essentially counterproductive. 
In April 2015 a new defence white paper, ‘Unified Effort’, was released. The 
paper discusses the changed security environment, the state and future of the 
Armed Forces, MDC and more. The report acknowledged the new threat and risk 
environment, claiming that the new situation demanded significant measures to 
strengthen Norway’s defence, with the underlying premise that Russia would be 
the ‘defining factor’ of Norwegian defence planning.382 The report emphasised 
the importance of realising the consequences this would have for the possible 
scenarios Norway might find herself struggling with. Scenarios were outlined that 
placed Norway in a predicament where she would have to act alone to face 
diplomatic and military pressure in the High North, or assume a 
disproportionately large role in protecting the Baltic states over extended 
periods of time.383 Such scenarios would demand more from the Norwegian 
Armed Forces than what it is currently able to achieve, requiring such ability to 
be built up.384 The report placed a great deal of emphasis on the relationship 
with the U.S., through bilateral agreements, NATO through collective defence, 
and NATO’s largest members, the UK and Germany through the Northern Group 
and FNC, firmly placing Norwegian security in these hands.385 Although the report 
reiterated the traditional view of Norwegian security, it also noted that when it 
comes to saving money, there are many possibilities that were so far left 
unused: 
                                         
380 ‘NORDEFCO Annual Report 2013’, p. 12 
381 Kvalvik, ’Internasjonalt Forsvarssamarbeid’ 
382 ‘Defence White Paper 2015’, ‘Unified Effort’, 
https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/fd/dokumenter/unified-effort.pdf, 
accessed 15 September 2015, p. 5 
383 Ibid., pp. 55-57 
384 Ibid. 
385 Ibid., pp. 44-47 
103 
 
If multinational cooperation is to have a sizeable economic effect, 
financial savings must be a clear aim. Usually, the biggest gain will be 
in areas with few and costly units. We should not limit ourselves to 
support activities, but also include operational capacities. The 
successful co-operation on the F-16 aircraft illustrates this. The 
procurement of, for example, new combat aircraft and new 
submarines can provide similar and perhaps even better opportunities. 
Also, for Norway to finance the new maritime patrol aircraft it may be 
necessary to co-operate with other allies. […] The Expert Commission 
believes that there is a large unexploited potential to create cost 
effective solutions through the increased use of multinational 
cooperation, even if such solutions can be challenging to establish. 
This potential will increase in step with the gradual trend towards 
fewer and more expensive units in Western armed forces. Therefore, 
economic savings through this type of measure are particularly 
relevant in the longer term.386  
Once more a political study emphasises that Norway should not exclude 
cooperation on operational capabilities from its list of areas for cooperation with 
other countries, a stark contrast to the Ministry’s restrictive policy on the 
matter. This report, along with the NDRE reports and the Possibility Study meant 
that evidence had been mounting for a while regarding the possibilities of MDC, 
and what is necessary to do in order to achieve real savings. However, there are 
few indications that Norwegian behaviour will change. 
Arguably, the events in Wales played right into the hands of Norway, seeing as 
she is one of the few countries that have both proved a loyal ally through 
continuous participation, and one of few who is making good on a promise to 
increase defence expenditure. Also, for a country that has expressed scepticism 
and pragmatism when faced with initiatives that sought to ‘achieve more with 
less’, an emphasis closer to ‘you get what you pay for’387 is more along the lines 
of what Norway prefers. This can allow her to avoid being dragged into projects 
and initiatives that she sees little value in, all the while a focus on spending can 
place Norway in a positive light due to her favourable economic outlook and 
potential for budget hikes. This removes any necessity for deep cooperation 
restricting national freedom of action. 
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But if the history that I have described is any guide, promises of funds for the 
Armed Forces have since the Cold War seldom resulted in actual, meaningful 
increases in the defence budget, even if the situation is described as a crisis. 
Moreover, even if the budgets were to increase, there is no guarantee that they 
could be spent where they are most needed, due to regional politics and 
political horse trading. Since Norway hasn’t changed her attitude toward 
integration by now, it might not be likely that she does so anytime soon. 
According to Gen. Diesen, the reason why this is happening this way is not 
complicated to explain, but very difficult to remedy:  
The political leadership of the Armed Forces and the Armed Forces 
themselves perceive this to be difficult and uncomfortable. Politicians 
prefer to do what they do best, which is to push the problem in front 
of them, not taking into account that the problem is actually growing 
as they push. That is part of the challenge here, the longer we wait 
the worse it gets.  Within the forces themselves, most people are 
naturally reluctant to lose units and bases, not only because they wish 
to maintain a strong defence, but also because it affects such things 
as career opportunities, the sustainment of specialised skills etc. The 
rank and file are more concerned about their own service or branch in 
the short term than they are about the long term future of the forces 
overall, which is only human. But that is why reforms like this can 
only be implemented top down by politicians with the overview and 
ruthlessness of statesmen.388 
Never one to mince his words, Gen. Diesen indicates that the lack of willingness 
to do what is, at least in Diesen’s mind, pressingly necessary is not only found in 
the political community, but also the military. Traces of such experiences can be 
seen among my sources, as Col. Kampenes explains: 
The reason why this is not possible is really found further down in the 
organisation. It is hard for us to achieve more cooperation, because 
some do not see the benefits. Some times they are unwilling to try. Of 
course, they have a lot of other things to do in the same timeframe, 
causing them to prioritise. Some initiatives tend to disappear, because 
there are some who just don’t see the point, and work to reduce its 
priority in the organisation. It is actually quite interesting when you 
sit where I’m sitting, and can see who’s in charge. It’s certainly not 
the Minister, or the chief of defence.389 
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It is also highly plausible that other pre-conceived notions can function as 
contributing factors to shape decision-making. According to Gen. Diesen such 
mechanisms as national prestige, self-image, tradition and force of habit 
fundamentally influence how nations still approach these questions, as is proved 
by the reluctance of the major European powers to accept a greater degree of 
joint defence planning and procurement – despite the fact that this would 
increase their capabilities significantly.390  
Assuming the premise that Norway is actually ignoring beneficial advice from 
both scholars and Generals due to some pre-conceived notion or truth, Nina 
Græger provides some interesting insight into other instances of the same 
situation in the Norwegian Armed Forces: 
In the Norwegian defence discourse, there have been attempts at 
delegitimising carriers of alternative representations by characterising 
them as naïve, marginal, misinformed, unrealistic etc. and therefore 
as irrelevant or even potentially damaging to Norway’s special 
security needs.391 
Although Græger discussed issues before 2005, the idea of a stringent 
maintenance of truths may apply to Norway’s approach to MDC as well, given 
that the idea continues to be maintained that deep integration with another 
country, such as the ‘Possibilities Study’ suggests, will ultimately lead to loss of 
national freedom of action. Græger states that the carriers of alternative truths, 
or ‘representations’ as she puts it, often have been delivered by researchers, 
younger officials and officers who have participated in international operations 
and therefore have been exposed to alternative narratives.392 This means that 
the ones that are in power seldom present alternative solutions or radical ideas, 
with the exception here being Gen. Diesen. Powerful individuals championing 
radical ideas, strategies or policies is not uncommon. There are many cases 
where reform processes or efforts promoting change are spearheaded by the 
strength of the individual to an equal or greater extent than the strength of the 
argument. Marshal Tukhachevsky, a star in the Soviet Army who fell victim to 
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the purge in 1937, promoted his ideas both through compelling argument as well 
as through a compelling persona. He is described to have had ‘attracted to 
himself the bright innovative spirits of a whole generation of officers like a 
magnet’.393 Whether or not Tukhachevsky died because of his ideas or his 
persona, it was clear that he was an undesirable element in the Red Army. His 
ideas were nonetheless adopted, possibly indicating that the problem lay with 
the person rather than the idea itself.  
Comparing Tukhachevsky to Diesen might be a bridge too far, however Diesen is 
certainly a charismatic figure whose ideas have been resisted. Given that Diesen 
was victim of bureaucratic inertia and resistance to change, it begs the question 
whether attitudes toward integration and MDC will change now that Diesen is 
less and less active in the debate, and if Norway will change her approach in the 
future. There are certainly enough proponents for deeper integration with other 
nations. However, such integration does come at a cost, and many nations, 
including Norway, are reluctant to accept that cost. National sovereignty, 
freedom of action, and assured access to capabilities are, as we have seen, the 
primary blockers for most nations. In order to achieve the full potential of MDC, 
nations will have to trade control and freedom for economies of scale, a trade 





                                         






The period from 2005 to 2014 and beyond has seen a lot of attention given to 
multinational defence cooperation. The Norwegian Armed Forces entered the 
period with significant problems stemming from two decades of inadequate 
funding and obsolete materiel, as well as an overly ambitious mission as an 
‘Invasion Defence’ force. The events following the end of the Cold War brought 
about change, but not the change needed to structure the Armed Forces so that 
it was able to solve its mission, nor balance its budget. Surprisingly, these events 
occurred with little or no debate in the public sphere. On the contrary, 
politicians regularly expressed that the foundations of Norwegian security were 
firm, referring both to her steadfast reliance upon NATO and the U.S., but also 
her relatively unchanged security and threat perception. This effectively says 
that since everyone agrees on this, there is no point debating it. 
When Sverre Diesen was became Chief of Defence in 2005, he soon produced and 
co-produced two major studies that promoted the potential benefits of MDC and 
deep integration between Armed Forces. The studies, along with Gen. Diesen’s 
personal efforts, ultimately promoted MDC as a viable strategy in the mind of 
officers and politicians in Norway. The Armed Forces were already facing 
challenges, and ‘techflation’ and ‘critical mass’ exacerbated these challenges.  
Motivated primarily by prospects of cost reduction and capability retention, 
Norway participated in two main MDC initiatives from 2005-2014: The NORDEFCO 
initiative and NATO’s ‘Smart Defence’ initiative.  
In NORDEFCO, Norway found an initiative where it enjoys a great deal of relative 
influence but little room for action, for fear of conflicting or duplicated efforts 
in NATO, and for giving the impression that NATO is now less important for 
Norway. Studies have shown that because of shared borders, culture, attitudes, 
size and composition of their Armed Forces, the Nordic countries are well suited 
for cooperation efforts. Despite this apparent match, projects have failed, and 
others have enjoyed only limited progress. These issues, along with power 
struggles and industry protectionism have called into question the viability of 
the endeavour. It is possible that Norway participates in NORDEFCO as a hedging 
effort, attempting to create support and a bond between the nations without 
signing too many contracts limiting their freedom of action. Because Norway 
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emphasises participation rather than output, it is possible that her rationale for 
efforts in NORDEFCO mirrors her rationale for international operations: an 
expectation of reciprocity in form of support from the other nations in the 
framework. The rationale being that Norway might need this support in the 
event of ‘grey area’ conflicts where an opponent (Russia) might seek to put 
pressure on her to change her policies or behaviour.  
In NATO’s ‘Smart Defence’ initiative, Norway has found an initiative where it 
enjoys very little relative influence, and where even the smallest projects can 
find themselves slowed down by bureaucracy. The core tenets of the initiative 
have been somewhat ignored in favour of excessive focus on a list of projects 
that have not necessarily been chosen with the core ideas of the initiative in 
mind, causing the limited enthusiasm that was there early on to dissipate. The 
initiative is arguably a response to deep-rooted problems of the NATO Alliance, 
requiring a lot more than a list of projects to solve. Norway’s efforts in ‘Smart 
Defence’ can be seen as a continuation of its policy of participation as an effort 
to put ‘loyalty money’ in the NATO (U.S.) bank, making the U.S. more likely to 
secure Norwegian interest even in challenging scenarios. This is much in the 
same way as with NORDEFCO.  
My findings suggest that the Norwegian approach to MDC is characterised by two 
main traits: 1) Norway is a pragmatic, sometimes ambivalent, partner, who 
participates as a means to gather ‘loyalty points’ with her partner. 2) Norway 
willingly participates, but only if participation brings with it few or no strings 
attached. These traits are arguably based on a desire to both minimise its own 
commitments while maximising the potential of receiving help when needed.  
After 2014, events in the Ukraine have changed the security climate, bringing 
the prospect of war in Europe into people’s minds. Norway’s response has been 
to propose that NATO focuses on its core area and ability to reassure Allies of its 
Article 5 commitments. Norway has focused on increased spending as a solution 
for increased capabilities rather than lofty claims of economies of scale from 
deep integration. In the Nordics, Norway has promoted the idea of Nordic 
solidarity as a counter to Russian aggression. At the same time, studies show 
that Norway’s participation in MDC has yielded less than desired savings and 
capability retention. In order to really save money, deeper integration is 
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needed. According to Gen. Diesen, the implementation of such integration 
requires uncomfortable and tough decisions, decisions only a ruthless statesman 
is able to make. It begs the question whether Norway’s politicians are really 
avoiding the integration that Gen. Diesen advocates. As the current policy is a 
continuation of a longstanding Norwegian policy, history might deem it wiser and 
more statesman-like to stand firm in the chosen approach, rather than to depart 
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